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The Equal Access to Justice Act - Are the Bankruptcy
Courts Less Equal than Others?

Matthew J. Fischer
INTRODUCTION

In 1980, Congress passed the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA),1 which allows courts and agencies to award costs and fees,
including attorney's fees, to parties who prevail in litigation against
the federal government.2 In the absence of another statute specifically providing for a fee award, the BAJA mandates such an award
unless the court finds that the government's position was substantially justified or that special circumstances make such an award unjust.3 Prior to the enactment of the BAJA, the federal government
was immune from statutory and common law fee-shifting provisions
1. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325 (1980)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). The
EAJA provides, in relevant part:
§ 2412 Costs and Fees
·
(a)(l) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as
enumerated in § 1920 of this title, but not including the fees and expenses of attorneys,
may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the
United States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her
official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action...•
(b) Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and
expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United
States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her official
capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action. The United States shall be liable
for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under
the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an
award....
(d)(l)(A) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to
a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to
any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action
(other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency
action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that
action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. .••
(d)(2)(F) "court" includes the United States Court of Federal Claims and the United
States Court of Veterans Appeals ....
28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
,
2. 5 U.S.C. § 504, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988). A party "prevails" over the federal government when it obtains a favorable ruling or settlement, even if it does not "prevail" on all the
issues in the litigation. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4990. For two examples of prevailing parties in the bankruptcy context,
see infra notes 23, 31.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988).
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under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.4 The EAJA thereby
puts the government on equal footing with nongovernment litigants
potentially subject to fee-shifting. The EAJA grants fee-shifting authority to "any court having jurisdiction of such action."5
Courts and commentators currently dispute whether the EAJA
grants the federal bankruptcy courts authority to shift fees against
the federal government.6 A split between the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits frames the controversy. The Tenth Circuit has held that
Congress granted EAJA authority to the bankruptcy courts,7
whereas the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that bankruptcy courts are
not "any court" within the meaning of the BAJA and thus cannot
shift fees. s
The applicability of the BAJA to the bankruptcy courts is important because the federal government is either a lender or guarantor of more than $870 billion in loans.9 In addition, the
government assumes the role of creditor in many of its contractual
relations by making progress or advance payments to contractors
4. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Socy., 421 U.S. 240, 265-68 (1975). The
statutory and common law exceptions to the "American rule" - that each party must bear
its own legal expenses - are numerous. The American rule dictates that a prevailing litigant
is not entitled to collect reasonable attorney's fees from the loser. 421 U.S. at 247. Although
the Supreme Court in Alyeska rejected the "private attorney general" exception to the
American rule in cases involving the federal government, 421 U.S. at 265-68, the Court recognized the "common fund" and bad faith exceptions to the rule. 421 U.S. at 257-59. Other
exceptions are established by statute, including Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5{k) {1988); Title III of the Organized Crime Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2520(b)(3) (1988); the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988); the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1988); the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973l{e) (1988); the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2060(c), (f), 2072(a), 2073
{1988); and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
For a general discussion of the American rule and its exceptions, see Fred B. Westfall, Note,
The Equal Access to Justice Act: How to Recover Attorneys' Fees & Litigation Expenses from
the United States Government, 13 U. ToL. L. REv. 149, 150-55 (1981).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2412{a), (b) (1988) (emphasis added).
6. The law clearly permits bankruptcy courts to shift fees and costs against private litigants. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) {1988) (providing for award of fees for willful violation of a
stay of actions against property); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7054 (providing for award of costs); FED.
R. BANKR. P. 9011 (providing for sanctions including fees and costs); see also infra note 171.
7. O'Connor v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 942 F.2d 771-74 {10th Cir. 1991); see also Charles
R. Haywood, Note, The Power of Bankruptcy Courts to Shift Fees under the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 985 (1994). The Chicago Note was published immediately
prior to publication of this Note; it reaches the same conclusion and addresses some of the
arguments examined here.
8. Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 981 {1990).
9. As of 1992, $157 billion was owed to the United States under various direct lending
programs. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN·
MENT, F1scAL YEAR 1994, at 51 (1993). The government also had guaranteed $587 billion
worth of outstanding loans as of 1992. Id. The federal government accounted for 18.2% of
all lending in this country between 1987 and"l991. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTI·
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 336, No. 518 {113th ed. 1993) (calculating this figure
using a weighted average of each of the five years in question).
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under long-term deals.10 The government also often takes title or a
secured position in the goods being manufactured under contract,
potentially leading to litigation if the contractor files for bankruptcy.11 The likely bankruptcy of some percentage of government
borrowers and contractors will continue to require the federal government to appear in the bankruptcy courts as an interested creditor.12 The federal government, just like any other creditor, must
file a proof of claim in bankruptcy to establish the priority of its
liens.13
Furthermore, any time a party indebted to the government files
for bankruptcy, potential litigation issues arise regarding compliance with the automatic stay, preference, and permanent injunction
provisions of the bankruptcy code.14 The federal government, spe10. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2307 (1988) (authorizing military agencies to make advance payments under contracts if adequate security is obtained and the public interest is served); 41
U.S.C. § 255 (1988) (authorizing any executive agency to make advance payments under contracts if adequate security is obtained and the public interest is served); see also United States
v. Lindberg Corp., 882 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1989) (enforcing the United States' title to workin-progress inventory after manufacturer's insolvency); In re American Pouch Foods, Inc.,
769 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986); United States v. Wincom
Corp. (In re Wincom Corp.), 76 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987). In addition, the government
finances health care providers through the Medicare program by making interim payments to
participating providers, 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(e) (1988); 42 C.F.R. § 413.64 (1992), as well as
estimated advances for capital expenses. 42 C.F.R. § 412.116 (1992). The government sometimes makes overpayments which might lead to litigation if the provider files for bankruptcy.
See, e.g., University Medical Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re University Medical Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065
(3d Cir. 1992).
11. The government sometimes sues the debtor for possession of the goods manufactured
to date. See, e.g., United States v. Wincom Corp. (In re Wincom), 76 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1987); United States v. Economy Cab & Tool Co. (In re Economy Cab & Tool Co.), 47 B.R.
708 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). Litigation may also arise between the government and other
creditors of the debtor who claim the identical collateral. See, e.g., United States v. Ansonia
Brass & Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452 (1910); First Natl. Bank of Geneva v. Biallas (In re
Denalco Corp.), 51 B.R. 77 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1985), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
57 B.R. 392 (N.D. Ill. 1986). Occasionally, the government becomes simultaneously involved
in both types of suits. See, e.g., United States Dept. of Energy v. Reynolds Mfg. Co. (In re
Reynolds Mfg. Co.), 68 B.R. 219 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986).
12. The increasing prevalence of bankruptcy filings may also increase participation by the
federal government in bankruptcy adjudications. As of March 31, 1993, 1,197,589 bankruptcy
cases were pending. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
WORKLOAD STATISTICS, MARCH 31, 1993, at 6-7 (1993) (hereinafter WORKLOAD STATIS·
TICS]. Although the number of cases filed during the 12 months ending on March 31, 1993,
was 2.7% less than the prior 12 months, it was the first decrease in 10 years. Id. at 5-6 & tbl.
5. The number of cases filed annually has increased from 623,413 in 1989 to 939,935 in 1993,
representing a 66.3% increase over 5 years. Id.
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (1988). Although federal law determines the priority of any lien
held by the federal government, a federal lien enjoys no automatic superiority to state liens
held by other creditors. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 740 (1979)
(adopting state law to govern federal security interests).
14. See, e.g., Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.)
(noting that bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over voidable preference action), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 981 (1990); In re American Pouch Foods, Inc., 769 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming government's relief from automatic stay), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986); Inslaw,
Inc. v. United States (In re Inslaw, Inc.), 76 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1987) (referring to
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cifically the Internal Revenue Service, is a frequent violator of the
automatic stay15 and permanent injunction16 provisions of the
bankruptcy code.17 The prevalence of federal lending and the increase in bankruptcy filings highlight the importance of a resolution
to the question of the EAJA's applicability to the bankruptcy
courts.18
This Note argues that the bankruptcy courts have authority
under the BAJA to shift fees against the federal government. Part I
discusses the relevant caselaw and examines the basis of the current
controversy. Part II examines the statutory language, the legislative
history, and the stated purposes of the BAJA and concludes that
each of these aspects of the statute demonstrates a congressional
intent to grant fee-shifting authority to the bankruptcy courts. Part
III considers alternatives to finding bankruptcy court jurisdiction
over BAJA disputes, rejecting each as inefficient and unnecessary.
This Note concludes that courts should construe the BAJA consistinjunctive powers of the bankruptcy court and implicating federal government for violation
of automatic stay).
15. After a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, the automatic stay prohibits creditors from
continuing or commencing any action to enforce judgments, collect debts, or perfect liens
against the property of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362{a) {1988). Some legal actions against the
debtor are not prohibited, 11 U.S.C. § 362{b) {1988), and creditors may move to have the
stay lifted for cause. 11 U.S.C. § 362{d) (1988).
16. The discharge of a debtor in bankruptcy acts·as an injunction against commencement
or continuation of collection actions with regard to discharged debts against the debtor or the
debtor's property. See 11 U.S.C. § 524{a) {1988).
17. Due to an uncooperative computer, the IRS has not adequately controlled enforcement actions against tax debtors, a shortcoming that has resulted in numerous "opportunities" for the IRS to appear before the bankruptcy· courts to try to explain its repeated
violations of the bankruptcy code. One court observed:
In its more than two decade-long involvement as a practitioner, professor and judge in
the bankruptcy system, this court has never encountered a more egregious flaunting of
the bankruptcy system as that which it has seen by the IRS in this case.... This conduct
has only been engaged in by those in charge of the IRS's computers.
Abernathy v. United States (In re Abernathy), 150 B.R. 688, 696 & n.10 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1993); see also IRS v. Germaine (In re Germaine), 152 B.R. 619, 629 {Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993)
{letters and calls from IRS violating permanent injunction blamed on " 'computer error' ");
Nichols v. IRS (In re Nichols), 143 B.R. 104, 108 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) {"Multiple and
egregious violations of the automatic stay go uncompensated, merely because the IRS is the
violator."); In re Solis, 137 B.R. 121, 123 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (violation of automatic stay
due to computer failure); United States v. Fernandez (In re Fernandez), 125 B.R. 317, 318
(Bankr. M.D. Fla.), affd., 132 B.R. 775 (M.D. Fla. 1991), revd., 94 T.N.T. 63-11 (M.D. Fla.
1994); Cowart v. IRS (In re Cowart), 128 B.R. 492, 497 {Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1990); In re Price,
103 B.R. 989, 992 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989), affd., 130 B.R. 259 {N.D. Ill. 1991); In re Shafer, 63
B.R. 194, 198 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986); In re Conti, 50 B.R. 142, 144 {Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); In
re Newlin, 29 B.R. 781, 784 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
18. Despite the small decrease in bankruptcy filings, adversary proceedings are being
brought faster than the bankruptcy courts can adjudicate them. As of March 31, 1993,
138,907 adversary proceedings were pending in the bankruptcy courts, a 24.1 % increase from
the prior year. WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 12, app. tbl. F-8, at 85. In the 12 months
prior to March 31, 1993, 100,412 adversary proceedings were filed and 73,449 were disposed
of meaning there is over a one-year backlog in the bankruptcy courts for adversary proceedings. Id. See also supra note 12.
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ently with its language, history, and purpose, and allow the bankruptcy courts to shift fees and costs against the federal government
in appropriate cases.
I. THE

CURRENT STATE OF THE CONTROVERSY

Although three circuit courts have decided cases presenting the
issue of whether the bankruptcy courts may shift fees under the authority of the EAJA, only two have explicitly addressed the issue of
jurisdiction.19 In O'Connor v. United States Department of Energy,20 the Tenth Circuit held that bankruptcy courts could exercise
EAJA power because they fall within the EAJA's jurisdictional
grant to "any court." The Eleventh Circuit, however, concluded
otherwise in Gower v. Farmers Home Administration (In re
Davis), 21 holding that the bankruptcy courts cannot exercise EAJA
power because they are not "courts of the United States" as defined
in 28 U.S.C. § 451.22 This Part examines the position of each circuit
in detail to set the stage for the comprehensive analysis of bankruptcy court jurisdiction under the EAJA in Part II.
A.

The Tenth Circuit Position -

O'Connor

The Tenth Circuit, in O'Connor v. United States Department of
Energy, 23 held that a bankruptcy court may shift fees under the
19. O'Connor v. United States Dept. of Energy, 942 F.2d 771 {10th Cir. 1991); Gower v.
Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136 {11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
981 (1990). In United States Small Business Admin. v. Esmond (In re Esmond), 752 F.2d
1106 (5th Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the bankruptcy court in order to
give the parties an opportunity to present their evidence on the issue of the government's
alleged substantial justification for its position. 752 F.2d at 1109. The appellate court apparently presumed that bankruptcy courts have authority to shift fees under the EAJA because
it remanded the case for an evaluation of a defense to the claim for fees. 752 F.2d at 1109.
This decision lends some credence to the argument that the plain meaning of the statute is
clear. See infra section 11.A.1. The Esmond case, however, lends only nominal support because the Esmond court did not explicitly consider whether the bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction under the EAJA.
20. 942 F.2d 771 {10th Cir. 1991).
21. 899 F.2d 1136 {11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 {1990).
22. Section 451, titled "Definitions," provides:
The term "court of the United States" includes the Supreme Court of the United States,
courts of appeals, district courts constituted by chapter 5 of this title, including the Court
of International Trade and any court created by Act of Congress the judges of which are
entitled to hold office during good behavior.
28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988). This definition excludes the bankruptcy courts, which are constituted
by chapter 6 of title 28. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-144, 151-58 {1988).
23. 942 F.2d 771 {10th Cir. 1991). In O'Connor, the Department of Energy filed a motion
to enforce a reorganization plan and, alternatively, to convert the bankruptcy from a chapter
11 reorganization to a chapter 7 liquidation. 942 F.2d at 772. The bankruptcy court denied
the motion and awarded attorney's fees under the EAJA to the prevailing party, O'Connor.
942 F.2d at 772. The district court reversed the award, relying on Gower v. Farmers Home
Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136 {11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990), See infra
section I.B. The debtor appealed. 942 F.2d at 772.
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BAJA because bankruptcy courts fall within the plain meaning of
"any court"24 and because the inclusion of bankruptcy courts furthers BAJA policies.25 The O'Connor court relied on its interpretation of the "plain meaning" of the EAJA, invoking the general
principle that "[a] court should venture into the thicket of legislative history only when necessary to determine 'a statutory purpose
obscured by ambiguity.' "26 The O'Connor court held that the plain
meaning of "any court" includes the bankruptcy courts.27
The O'Connor court also noted that Congress could have modified the term "any court" if it had intended to limit the jurisdictional reach of the BAJA to a specific subset of courts.28 The court
reasoned that the unmodified use of court supported its view that
the plain meaning of "any court" included the bankruptcy courts.29
In further support of its textual analysis, the O'Connor court also
stated that its conclusion comports with the general purpose of the
EAJA, namely to encourage citizens to challenge unreasonable
government action despite the high cost of litigation.3o
B.

The Eleventh Circuit Position -

In re Davis

In Gower v. Farmers Home Administration (In re Davis),31 the
Eleventh Circuit held that the bankruptcy courts lack authority
under the BAJA to shift fees because they are not "any court"
within the meaning of the BAJA.32 The Davis court relied on two
24. O'Connor, 942 F.2d at 773.
25. 942 F.2d at 774.
26. 942 F.2d at 773 (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commn., 481 U.S.
454, 461 (1987)).
27. 942 F.2d at 773.
28. 942 F.2d at 773.
29. 942 F.2d at 773-74.
30. 942 F.2d at 774.
31. 899 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990). Davis, the debtor, borrowed $985,000 from the Farmers Home Administration {FmHA) and subsequently filed
bankruptcy. 899 F.2d at 1137. Gower, the trustee, tried to recover payments made to the
FmHA as preferential transfers under § 547{b) of the bankruptcy code. 899 F.2d at 1137
(construing 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), (c) {1988)). The bankruptcy court found the FmHA's conduct misleading toward other creditors, ordered the return of the payments, and equitably
subordinated FmHA's claims. 899 F.2d at 1137. The trustee was therefore a prevailing party
and the bankruptcy court awarded EAJA fees. The FmHA appealed. 899 F.2d at 1138.
32. 899 F.2d at 1138-42. The court also held that a bankruptcy trustee is not a "party,"
899 F.2d at 1142-45, defined in the EAJA as:
i) an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action
was filed, or
ii) any owner of an unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government, or organization, the net worth of which did not exceed
$7,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, and which had not more than 500 employees at the time the civil action was filed.
28 U.S.C. § 2412{d){2){B) (1988). Because the Eleventh Circuit held that the trustee is not a
party, it found the trustee ineligible to receive an award. 899 F.2d at 1145. Although the
dispute surrounding the proper definition of "party" within the EAJA is beyond the scope of
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sources to support its denial of jurisdiction: the precedent of
Bowen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue33 and the legislative
history of the EAJA.34
In Bowen, the Eleventh Circuit h.eld that the tax courts did not
have jurisdiction to award BAJA fees to a prevailing party, relying
on cross-references within title 28 and the unique position of the tax
courts under title 26.35 The Bowen court first noted that the BAJA
allowed recovery of the "costs" enumerated in section 1920 of title
28.36 Section 1920 is entitled "Taxation of Costs" and partially codifies the equitable power of the federal courts.37 The Bowen court
then noted that section 1920 states that costs may be shifted by a
"court of the United States,"38 a term that is defined in 28 U.S.C.
§ 451.39 The court reasoned that the EAJA's reference to the costs
enumerated in section 1920 also incorporated section 1920's jurisdictional limitation to "courts of the United States" as defined by
section 451.40 Therefore, the Bowen court held that BAJA fees
this Note, this footnote addresses the issue briefly because the jurisdictional authority of the
bankruptcy courts to shift EAJA fees is of practical importance only if bankruptcy trustees
are "parties" eligible to receive EAJA awards. The Davis court held that a trustee in bank·
ruptcy is not an eligible party to receive an EAJA award because the trustee did not fit
comfortably into the court's conception of "organization." 899 F.2d at 1144. The Eleventh
Circuit, however, subsequently limited that part of the Davis holding to Chapter 7 trustees.
In re Brickell Inv. Corp., 922 F.2d 696, 702-03 (11th Cir. 1991). Because, at a minimum,
Chapter 11 debtors in possession are eligible parties to receive awards, it is important to
establish the authority of the bankruptcy court to make EAJA awards.
The Davis court also argued that the difficulty in applying the EAJA's net-worth and
number-of-employees tests, see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988), to bankruptcy trustees militates towards finding trustees outside the definition of "party" under the EAJA. 899 F.2d at
1144 n.18. For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to recognize that the net-worth and
number-of-employees tests apply only to parties seeking mandatory awards under§ 2412(d)
and not to those seeking discretionary awards under§ 2412(b). See American Hosp. Assn. v.
Sullivan, 938 F.2d 216, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
For further analysis of the definition of "party" under the EAJA, see National nuck
Equip. Assn. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 972 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1992); Love
v. Reilly, 924 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1991); American Assn. of Retired Persons v. EEOC, 873
F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Louisiana ex rel Guste v. Lee, 853 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1988);
Unification Church v. INS, 762 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1985); 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900, 32,912 (1981);
Ralph V. Seep, Annotation, Who is "Party" Entitled to Recover Attorneys' Fees Under Equal
Access to Justice Act (28 U.S.C.S. § 2412(d)), 107 A.L.R. FED. 827 (1992).
33. 706 F.2d 1087 (11th Cir. 1983).
34. Davis, 899 F.2d at 1138-40.
35. Bowen, 706 F.2d at 1088.
36. Bowen, 106 F.2d at 1088. The EAJA provides, "judgment for costs, as enumerated in
§ 1920 of this title ... may be awarded ...." 28 U.$.C. § 2412(a) (1988).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1988); see Sprague v. Ticonic Natl. Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-65
(1939). The equitable power of the federal courts also allows courts to award attorney's fees
to a litigant. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (affirming an award of attor·
ney's fees based on the "inherent power" of a federal court).
38. Section 1920 states, "A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as
costs the following ... (listing costs]." 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1988).
39. See supra note 22.
40. Bowen, 706 F.2d at 1088.
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may be shifted only by courts listed in section 451,41 even though
the EAJA contains no explicit reference to section 451. Because
section 451 does not include the tax courts, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the tax courts lack EAJA authority.42 In Davis, the
court held that the analysis of Bowen applied "unambiguously" to
bankruptcy courts, which are also not included in section 451.43
In addition to the statutory cross-referencing analysis adopted
from the Bowen opinion, the Davis court also relied on a portion of
the legislative history of the EAJA to exclude the bankruptcy
courts from BAJA jurisdiction.44 The court quoted House Report
1418, which states:
Section 2412(b) [of the EAJA] permits a court in its discretion to
award attorney fees and other expenses to prevailing parties in civil
litigation involving the United States to the same extent it may award
fees in cases involving other parties. The courts so empowered are
those defined in section 451 of title 28, United States Code.45

This document plainly appears to restriet the courts eligible to shift
BAJA fees to those enumerated in section 451. The Davis court
buttressed its statutory argument with this seemingly unequivocal
legislative history to hold that the bankruptcy courts lacked jurisdiction to award fees under the EAJA.46
The circuit split defines the current state of the law on the bankruptcy court jurisdiction issue. Because the Tenth Circuit refused to
examine the legislative history in House Report 1418 that appears
to limit EAJA jurisdiction to the "courts of the United States"
listed in section 451, evidence that the Eleventh Circuit considered
probative, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits simply argue past each
other. No other courts have directly addressed the issue of bankruptcy court jurisdiction under the EAJA. 47 As a result, the bank41. 706 F.2d at 1088.
42. 706 F.2d at 1088.
43. Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136, 1139 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 981 {1990).
44. Davis, 899 F.2d at 1139.
45. 899 F.2d at 1139 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 17, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4996) (alteration in original). This statement, although describing subsection {b) of § 2412, informs the analysis of subsection {d) because of the similarity in the
phrasing of the jurisdiction granting language in each subsection. Subsection (b) grants fee
shifting authority to "any court having jurisdiction of such action," 28 U.S.C. § 2412{b)
{1988), which is nearly identical to the grant of subsection {d), which provides authority to
"any court having jurisdiction of that action," 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d){l)(A) (1988). According
to this piece of legislative history, it seems that EAJA power, in both subsections (b) and (d),
is limited to the "courts of the United States" enumerated in § 451 of title 28.
46. 899 F.2d at 1140.
47. One bankruptcy court has awarded EAJA fees without consideration of the jurisdiction question. Hagan v. Heckler (In re Hagan), 44 B.R. 59 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1984). Another
bankruptcy court reached the merits of an EAJA dispute without discussion of the jurisdiction question. In re Parks, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. {CCH) 'lI 9744 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984). In
United States Small Business Admin. v. Esmond (In re Esmond), 752 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir.
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ruptcy courts are left without clear or consistent guidance on this
issue.
II. INTERPRETING THE EAJA
Part I concluded that the current disagreement in the courts
over whether the EAJA grants the bankruptcy courts authority to
shift fees against the federal government reflects fundamentally different approaches to the question. This Part provides a comprehensive assessment of the arguments on either side, arguing that the
EAJA's text, legislative history, and purposes support the conclusion that the statute includes the bankruptcy courts.48 Section II.A
argues that the plain meaning of the statute's jurisdictional grant
covers the bankruptcy courts. This section also considers and re1985), the Fifth Circuit assumed that the bankruptcy courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate
EAJA disputes. See supra note 19.
Courts have addressed bankruptcy court jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7430, the tax
counterpart to the EAJA, which allows courts to award litigation costs to parties that prevail
against the federal government in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of
any tax under title 26. 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988). The EAJA is the model for 26 U.S.C. § 7430,
United States v. Germaine (In re Germaine), 152 B.R. 619, 625 n.6 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993),
but § 7430 supplants the EAJA for cases arising under the tax law. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(e)
(1988); Grewe v. United States (In re Grewe), 4 F.3d 299, 301 (4th Cir. 1993); Germaine, 152
B.R. at 625 n.6. The EAJA and § 7430 have been and should be interpreted consistently. See
Powell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 791 F.2d 385, 390 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Absent
some compelling reason to read the analogous phrases in the two statutes differently, they
should be interpreted consistently."). The main distinction in the respective grants of jurisdiction is that the EAJA grants jurisdiction to "any court," see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A)
(1988), while § 7430 allows only a "court of the United States" to shift fees. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 7430(c)(6) (1988).
One would therefore expect courts to be less likely to allow bankruptcy courts to award
§ 7430 fees than EAJA fees because bankruptcy courts are not "courts of the United States"
as that term is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988). Many courts, however, have interpreted
§ 7430 to include the bankruptcy courts within the "courts of the United States." See Germaine, 152 B.R. at 619; Abernathy v. United States (In re Abernathy), 150 B.R. 688 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1993); Kreidle v. Department of Treasury, IRS (In re Kreidle), 145 B.R. 1007
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1992); In re Chambers, 140 B.R. 233 (N.D. Ill. 1992). Bllt see In re Brickell
Inv. Corp., 922 F.2d 696, 696-97 {11th Cir. 1991) (holding that the bankruptcy court was not
able to shift fees under § 7430 because it was not a "court of the United States"); United
States v. Yochum (In re Yochum), 156 B.R. 816 (D. Nev. 1993) (holding that the bankruptcy
courts are not courts of the United States for the purposes of § 7430). Other courts have
assumed without discussion that the bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction under § 7430. See
Graham v. United States (In re Graham), 981F2d1135, 1139 (10th Cir. 1992); United States
v. McPeck, 910 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1990) (remanding to bankruptcy court for a factual determination under § 7430 and thus assuming authority without discussion); /ti re Robidoux, 116
B.R. 320 (D. Mass. 1990) (remanding to the bankruptcy court for a determination of whether
the amount of a§ 7430 award was appropriate); Samore v. Olson (In re Olson), 100 B.R. 458
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989) (reaching the merits of a § 7430 claim without discussing jurisdiction), affd., 121 B.R. 346 (N.D. Iowa 1990), affd., 930 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1991).
48. The importance of each of these methods of statutory interpretation is emphasized by
the fact that the Supreme Court has recently relied on each one to interpret the EAJA. See
Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 519-20 (1991) (relying on the plain language of the EAJA);
Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 883 (1989) (relying on the legislative history as evidence of
the EAJA's purpose); Commissioner of the INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 164·65 (1990) (relying
on the purpose of EAJA).
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jects arguments based on cross-references from the EAJA to other
statutes. Section Il.B argues that the EAJA's legislative history,
though complicated, supports the plain meaning of the text. Finally, section Il.C demonstrates that including bankruptcy courts
within BAJA jurisdiction advances the purposes of the statute,
which provides further evidence of congressional intent to include
the bankruptcy courts.

A. The Textual Meaning of the EAJA
Any statutory construction must begin with the language of the
statute.49 The language of the BAJA provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall
award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and
other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases
sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency
action, brought by or against the United States in any court having
jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of
the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.50
Section II.A.1 discusses the language of the BAJA, concluding that
"any court" plainly includes the bankruptcy courts. Section II.A.2
considers the argument based on a cross-reference to the definition
of a "court of the United States" and concludes that the language of
BAJA does not limit the statute's scope to those courts.
1.

The Plain Language of the EAJA

According to the plain language of the EAJA, the bankruptcy
courts should have the ability to shift fees against the federal government. The text of the BAJA grants jurisdiction over BAJA petitions to "any court." According to its plain and ordinary meaning,
the term court means" '[a] person or group of persons whose task
is to hear and submit a decision on cases at law.' "51 By this definition, bankruptcy courts are courts and therefore should be covered
by the BAJA's grant of authority to "any court."52
In addition, the phrase "any court" is unmodified in the BAJA,
even though Congress could have used the more restrictive "court
of the United States" if Congress had intended "any court" to mean
49. Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 519 (1991) (quoting United States v. James, 478 U.S.
597, 604 (1986) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring))); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
51. O'Connor v. United States Dept. of Energy, 942 F.2d 771, 773 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting WEBSTER'S II NEw RlvERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 320 (Anne H. Soukhanov et al.
eds., 1984)).
52. See 942 F.2d at 773.
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some subset of all federal courts.53 Congress's failure to modify
"any court" further indicates a broad textual grant of authority to
any court properly adjudicating a civil action.

Cross-References to the Definition of "Courts of the United
States"
An alternative textual analysis potentially conflicts with the result obtained by simply following the plain meaning of court. The
Eleventh Circuit has relied on cross-references within title 28 to
hold that the EAJA grants fee-shifting authority only to those
courts listed in section 451 of title 28.54 This statutory construction
was introduced in Bowen v. Commissioner, 55 and followed in
Gower v. Farmers Home Administration (In re Davis). 56 The
Bowen court transformed the EAJA's incorporation of the costs
enumerated in se.ction 1920 into an adoption of the jurisdictional
requirement of section 1920.57
·The EAJA's reference to section 1920, however, does not support the inference that the EAJA incorporates section 1920's jurisdictional limitation. First, the EAJA states only that "a judgment
for costs, as enumerated in section 1920 ... may be awarded."58
The EAJA makes no reference to section 1920's jurisdictional
limit.59
Second, this cross-referencing construction leads to an incongruous BAJA. The BAJA grants fee-shifting authority not only to
"any court" with subject matter jurisdiction,6° but also to "[a]n
agency that conducts an adversary adjudication." 61 It is unlikely
that Congress intended to grant fee-shifting authority to the courts
listed in section 451 as well as to all the agencies that conduct adversarial hearings yet intended to withhold that authority from the
2.

53. See 942 F.2d at 773-74. Congress uses the phrase "court of the United States" to limit
the term "courts" to those listed in 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988). Cf. 2 U.S.C. § 130b(a)(2) (1988);
5 U.S.C. § 5537(c) (1988); 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(l) (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 373(f), 1920 (1988).
The O'Connor court also noted that Congress could have modified "any court" with "constitutional" if Congress intended such a restriction. O'Connor, 942 F.2d at 773.
54. See supra section I.B.
55. 706 F.2d 1087 (11th Cir. 1983).
56. 899 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990).
57. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1988) (emphasis added). The costs enumerated in§ 1920 include
fees of the clerk and court reporter, printing fees, witness fees, docket fees, and compensation for court-appointed experts. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1988).
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted this
point in Essex Electro Engineers, Inc., v. United States Dept. of Energy, 757 F.2d 247 (Fed.
Cir. 1985), stating, "[W)e construe [the EAJA reference to § 1920) as delineating the kinds of
costs that can be awarded - not the kinds of courts having jurisdiction over EAJA applications." 757 F.2d at 251.
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988).
61. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(l) (1988).
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bankruptcy courts. To the contrary, the grant of authority to administrative agencies belies any congressional intent to limit BAJA
jurisdiction to the supposedly more qualified and prestigious
"courts of the United States." The inclusion of administrative agencies makes clear Congress's intent to provide comprehensive relief
to citizens besieged by unreasonable government action.62
Third, Congress would presumably have included important jurisdictional limitations to the BAJA in the BAJA itself, rather than
squirrel them away in section 1920. Careful examination of the
BAJA subsections exposes the tenuous nature of the link between
section 1920's jurisdictional limitation and the BAJA. The passage
of the BAJA altered the existing law,63 extending the common law
exceptions to the American rule to the federal government by creating subsection (b) of section 2412.64 In addition, the BAJA provides in section 2412's new subsection (d) that if the
nongovernment party prevails, the government must demonstrate
that its actions were substantially justified in order to avoid paying
that party's litigation costs.65 On the other hand, in amending subsection (a) of section 2412, the BAJA merely restates the law prior
to the EAJA, under which courts could transfer costs other than
attorney's fees as an exercise of equitable power.66 The reference
to section 1920 in the new subsection (a) simply distinguishes the
costs a court could shift against the government under section 2412
prior to the BAJA from the new fee-shifting authority granted by
the BAJA. Subsections (b) and (d) do not refer to section 1920.67
If Congress intended section 1920 to do more than just enumerate
the kind of costs that could be transferred under subsection (a) of
section 2412 - that is, if Congress intended actually to limit the
definition of "any court" in subsections (b) and (d) - these subsec62. The Davis court recognized the incongruity of including administrative agencies but
excluding bankruptcy courts, but held itself bound to this construction by the Bowen holding.
Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136, 1140 n.7 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990).
63. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 17-19, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4996-98.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1988); see H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 9, reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4987.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1988); see H.R. REP. No~ 1418, supra note 2, at 9-10, reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4987-88; H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5003, 5014-15.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1988); see H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 17, reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4996 ("Section 2412(a) preserves the law of the existing section 2412
.•.."). The prior law was stated in 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976), and interpreted in Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1334-35 (1st Cir. 1973) (stating that
§ 2412 waives the government's sovereign immunity with respect to costs but not attorney's
fees).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (d) (1988).
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tions would likely include the same reference to section 1920 found
in subsection (a).
The reference to the costs enumerated in section 1920 was taken
from the statute that' the EAJA replaced and was preserved in section 2412(a). The predecessor statute, An Act to Provide for Judgments for Costs Against the United States,68 stated, "costs, as
enumerated in section 1920 of this title ... may be awarded ... in
any court having jurisdiction of such action."69 The legislative history to the EAJA's predecessor even more clearly demonstrates
that Congress intended the reference to section 1920 only to enumerate the costs that could be awarded under the statute, not to
attach the restrictive jurisdiction of section 1920. The Senate Report states: "The costs which are referred to in this bill are listed in
section 1920 of title 28, United States Code ...." 70 As in the
EAJA, no mention is made of section 1920 with respect to
jurisdiction.11
This analysis demonstrates that in order to argue that the jurisdictional requirement of section 1920 limits section 2412(b) and
2412(d), one must presume that Congress meant to limit EAJA jurisdiction indirectly - by first attaching the jurisdiction of section
1920 to section 2412(a) and then extending the supposed jurisdictional limit of subsection (a) to subsections (b) and (d). A simpler
interpretation of the reference to section 1920 - and one better
supported by the textual and historical record - is that it provides
a shorthand delineation of the types of costs courts have historically
been able to award to preserve equitable treatment of all parties.
The argument put forth by the Eleventh Circuit that the bankruptcy
courts lack EAJA authority because they are not listed in section
451 is therefore incorrect because it conflicts with the plain meaning
of the EAJA, it leads to incongruous results, and it rests on a
strained interpretation of the statutory structure.
Although the text of the EAJA plainly appears to grant the
bankruptcy courts the authority to shift fees, courts and commentators disagree as to the sufficiency of a purely textual approach. The
Supreme Court, for example, recently looked beyond the plain
meaning of a statute to its "purposes and origins" in order to determine its meaning.72 Others, however, including most notably Jus68. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-507, 80 Stat. 308, amended by Equal Access to
Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325 (1980).
69. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-507, 80 Stat. 308, 308, amended by Equal Access
to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325 (1980).
70. S. REP. No. 1329, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2527,
2529.
71. Id., reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2527.
72. See Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455 (1989). The
Court, faced with a dispute over the meaning of the word "utilized" in the Federal Advisory

Note -

June 1994]

Equal Access to Justice Act

2261

tice Scalia, argue that textual plain meaning is a sufficient method
for statutory analysis.73 Because courts are sometimes reluctant to
rely solely on the plain meaning of a statute,74 and in order to avoid
the skepticism that exclusive reliance on plain meaning sometimes
engenders,75 the next two sections examine the history and purposes of the BAJA.
B.

The Legislative History of the EAJA

Congress has amended the BAJA several times since enacting it
in 1980.76 This section investigates the legislative history of both
the original passage of the BAJA and the subsequent amendments
which affect the BAJA's definition of "any court," and concludes
that Congress originally intended to grant EAJA jurisdiction to the
bankruptcy courts and that subsequent amendments did not undermine that intent. This section reconciles the broad language of the
BAJA, granting fee-shifting authority to "any court" having subject
matter jurisdiction over the substantive issue before the court, with
House Report 1418 which stipulates that "[t]he courts so empowered [to exercise EAJA authority] are those defined in section 451
of title 28, United States Code." 77 Section 11.B.1 discusses the legislative history behind the passage of the EAJA in 1980, and section
11.B.2 considers the subsequent amendments to the EAJA.
Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app.
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)), noted that" 'reliance on the plain language of [the statute] alone is
not entirely satisfactory.' " 491 U.S. at 452 (quoting Washington Legal Foundation v. United
States Dept. of Justice, 691 F. Supp. 483, 488 (D.D.C. 1988)). The Court then considered the
context of the statute's enactment and its legislative history as provided in congressional
committee reports. 491 U.S. at 455-62.
73. See Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 534 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia wrote,
I join the opinion of the Court ... which respond[s] persuasively to the legislativehistory and policy arguments made by respondent. It is regrettable that we have a legal
culture in which such arguments have to be addressed (and are indeed credited by a
Court of Appeals) .... [T]he plain text of the statute should have made this litigation
unnecessary and unmaintainable.
112 S. Ct. at 534.
74. See Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 530-33; Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 455; United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) ("When aid to construction of the meaning
of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which
forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.'").
75. One commentator has written:
Judges also frequently command respect for the statutory text by declaring that its "plain
meaning" must govern. However, we encounter the formula often in contexts where it
seems invoked to avoid acknowledging judges' policy preferences. We are entitled to
regard it with some skepticism as a reliable canon of judicial self-restraint.
JAMES w. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 51 {1982).
76. See Act of Oct. 29, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, §§ 301{a), 502(b), 506(a), 106 Stat.
4491, 4511, 4512, 4513; Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, §§ 2, 6, 99 Stat. 183, 184-86,
186; Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 292(c), 96 Stat.
324, 574.
77. H.R REP. No. 1418, supra note 2.
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1. Enactment of the EAJA
Understanding the historical context of the enactment of the
EAJA is crucial to understanding the statute's relationship to the
bankruptcy courts. When Congress enacted the BAJA in 1980,78
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (BRA) controlled the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.79 Congress passed the BAJA during
a statutory "transition period" between the old bankruptcy system
and the system created by the BRA.80 Different sections of the
BRA became effective at varying points throughout the transition
period. 81 Congress repealed the BRA before it became fully effective.82 Section 241 of the BRA gave the bankruptcy courts all the
jurisdiction of the district courts with respect to title 11 cases and
proceedings.s3 This "pass-through" jurisdiction was in place when
the EAJA was enacted in 1980.84 It is undisputed that a district
78. Public Law 96-481, which included the EAJA, was enacted on October 21, 1980. See
126 CoNG. REC. 29227 (1980).
79. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2668 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1482 (Supp. IV 1980)).
80. Some provisions of the BRA were effective immediately upon enactment, see Bankruptcy Reform Act of1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(d), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682, while the effective date of other sections was as late as April 1, 1984, see Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(b), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682. The interim period is known as the "transition period." Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 404(b), 92 Stat. 2549,
2683.
81. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682
(providing the different effective dates for the different BRA sections).
82. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 113, 98 Stat. 333 (codified at scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
83. Section 241 of the BRA defined the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a
court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but
not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or
related to cases under title 11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is commenced
shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district courts.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 241, 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. IV 1980) (amended 1984)
(emphasis added).
84. Section 241 of the BRA was not effective until April 1, 1984. See Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(b), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682. The bankruptcy courts, however, were allowed to exercise the increased jurisdiction of their successors for cases commenced during the transition period as follows:
(a) All cases commenced under title 11 of the United States Code during the transition
period shall be referred to the [transition] United States bankruptcy judges. The [transition] United States bankruptcy judges may exercise in such cases the jurisdiction and
powers conferred by subsection (b) of this section on the [new] courts of bankruptcy.••.
(b) During the transition period, the amendments made by section[ ] 241 ..• of this Act
shall apply to the [transitional] courts of bankruptcy ... the same as such amendments
apply to the [new] United States bankruptcy courts established under ... this Act.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405(a)(b), 92 Stat. 2549, 2685. Section
241 was to give the new bankruptcy courts power, in title 11 cases, to exercise all jurisdiction
conferred on the district courts. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. Section 405, by
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court may exercise BAJA authority in a case related to title 11.85
Therefore, when Congress granted the district courts the power to
shift fees under the BAJA in 1980, the bankruptcy courts, by way of
the pass-through jurisdiction of section 241 of the BRA, were also
vested with jurisdiction under the BAJA. 86
Although this analysis of the enactment of the EAJA seems to
indicate that Congress granted the bankruptcy courts BAJA authority simultaneously with the district courts, the language of
House Report 1418, which limits the courts eligible to shift BAJA
fees to those listed as courts of the United States in 28 U.S.C.
§ 451,87 seems to indicate a contrary intent to exclude the bankruptcy courts. A narrow focus on House Report 1418 may be misleading, however, as two other committee reports and a conference
report submitted to the full Congress on the BAJA do not include
any reference to section 451. 88 In its report, the House Committee
on Small Business stated, "The subsection (2412(d)(l)] applies to
all civil actions except tort actions and those already covered by
existing fee-shifting statutes."89 Nearly identical language appears
in the Senate report from the Committee on the Judiciary.9o Most
significantly, the Conference Report91 on the BAJA states that "the
[BAJA] specifically allows for the payment of attorney fees, (in addition to costs as previously listed) to the prevailing party in any
applying § 241 to the existing bankruptcy courts during the transition period, thereby gave
them the power to exercise jurisdiction conferred on the district courts in title 11 cases.
85. See Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136, 1141 {11th Cir.
1990).
86. Before the BRA was repealed, only two cases in the bankruptcy courts discussed the
EAJA. Hagan v. Heckler (In re Hagan), 44 B.R. 59 (Bankr. D.R.!. 1984); In re Parks, 84-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 'll 9744 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984). In Hagan, the court awarded EAJA
fees to the prevailing party without discussing jurisdiction. In Parks, the court refused to
make an award because the petitioner was not a prevailing party. Interestingly, the government party did not contest the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction in either case, nor did either
bankruptcy court raise the jurisdiction issue sua sponte.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988); see H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 17, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4996; see supra notes 44-45, 77, and accompanying text.
88. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 {1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5003, 5014; H.R. REP. No. 1005, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 {1980); S. REP. No.
253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. {1979).
89. H.R. REP. No. 1005, supra note 88, at 18 (emphasis added).
90. S. REP. No. 253, supra note 88, at 20.
91. Courts often place particular emphasis on Conference Committee reports when interpreting the meaning of st~tutes. See, e.g., Zajac v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 909 F.2d
1181, 1182 (8th Cir. 1990) {"The conference committee's report ... represents the final statement of terms agreed to by both houses. Next to the statute itself it is the most persuasive
evidence of congressional intent." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cohn v. United
States, 872 F.2d 533, 534 {2d Cir. 1989) ("Since the conference report sets forth the final
agreement of both houses, it is entitled to great weight in determining congressional intent."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848 {1989); see also Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the
Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 lowAL. REv. 195, 201 (1983)
("Conference committee reports ... are considered particularly weighty.").

2264

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 92:2248

civil action with the United States." 92 The Conference Report also
states that the "bill requires a Federal Court to award to a prevailing party other than the United States in a civil action involving the
United States fees ... and other expenses."93 Significantly, Congress did not modify "civil action" and used "federal court" rather
than "court of the United States." Because bankruptcy courts are
federal courts94 and bankruptcy actions are civil actions,9s the language of these three reports includes the bankruptcy courts among
those able to adjudicate BAJA petitions.
The language of these reports conflicts with House Report
1418's apparent limitation of "any court" to those courts enumerated in section 451.96 One obvious resolution of this conflict is that
the single statement in House Report 1418 simply does not represent the true intent of Congress regarding BAJA jurisdiction.97 Yet
even if House Report 1418 accurately reflects Congress's intent,
and only courts listed in 28 U.S.C. § 451 were granted BAJA jurisdiction, Congress still likely intended to include the bankruptcy
courts. The reference to "court of the United States" in House Report 1418 was made at a time when section 451 was scheduled to be
amended to include the bankruptcy courts. 98 Prior to the enactment of the BRA, section 451, in pertinent part, provided:
The term "court of the United States" includes the Supreme Court of
the United States, courts of appeals, district courts constituted by
chapter 5 of this title, including the Court of Claims, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, the Customs Court and any court ere92. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1434, supra note 88~ at 25, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5014 (emphasis added).
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Because bankruptcy courts are created by Congress and governed by title 28 of the
U.S. Code, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-158 (1988), they are federal courts.
95. The narrower of two Supreme Court constructions of "civil action" in the EAJA is "a
proceeding in a court." Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 894 (1989) (White, J., dissenting).
The majority in Hudson would include proceedings before an administrative law judge on
remand from a district court as a "civil proceeding." Hudson, 490 U.S. at 892. See also 28
U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988) ("[T]he district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11." (emphasis added)).
96. See supra notes 44-45, 77 and accompanying text.
97. In fact, additional evidence indicates that Congress did not intend to limit EAJA
jurisdiction to the "courts of the United States." The House Judiciary Committee amended
the long title of the Bill to read "An Act to provide for the payment by the United States of
certain fees and cost incurred by prevailing parties in Federal agency adjudications and in
civil action in courts of the United States." H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 18, reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4999 (emphasis added). The Conference Committee, however,
adopted the Senate bill, rather than the version the House Judiciary Committee reported on
in House Report 1418. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1434, supra note 88, at 20-21, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5009-10. The Senate bill was entitled "Equal Access to Justice Act." Id.
98. When Congress referred to § 451 in the EAJA's legislative history in 1980, the BRA
amendment adding the bankruptcy court to § 451 was already on the books, although it had
not yet become effective. See 28 U.S.C. § 451 (Supp. IV 1980) (including the amended version of § 451).
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ated by Act of Congress the judges of which are entitled to hold office
during good behavior.99

The BRA amended section 451 to add the " 'bankruptcy courts, the
judges of which are entitled to hold office for a term of 14
years.' "100 The amendment to section 451 was scheduled to go into
effect on April 1, 1984.101 Thus, even if House Report 1418 properly describes Congress's intent with respect to the scope of EAJA
authority,102 the bankruptcy courts, in their own right, would automatically assume EAJA authority in less than three years once the
BRA had been fully implemented.103 In the meantime, bankruptcy
courts would exercise all the power of the district court by virtue of
the pass-through jurisdiction that was applicable during the transition period.104 Because the bankruptcy courts, in practice, could
exercise EAJA authority without an explicit grant of jurisdiction
during the transition period, a specific congressional grant of authority was simply unnecessary.
2. Effect of Subsequent Events on the EAJA

Whatever the apparent intent of the Congress that originally
passed the EAJA, three subsequent events arguably shed light on
current congressional intent with respect to the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts under the EAJA. First, in 1984, Congress repealed
section 241 of the BRA, eliminating both the jurisdictional passthrough from the district courts to the bankruptcy courts and the
addition of the bankruptcy courts to the definition of the "courts of
the United States" in section 451 of title 28.10s The repeal of section 241 thereby eliminated the explicit statutory source of bankruptcy court authority over the BAJA. Second, in 1985, Congress
amended the EAJA's definition of "court" to include the U.S.
Claims Court.106 Third, in 1992, Congress again amended the
EAJA's definition of "court," this time to include the U.S. Court of
Veterans Appeals.107 Congress did not take advantage of either opportunity to address the scope of the EAJA with respect to the
bankruptcy court. Section II.B.2.a argues that the repeal of the
BRA did not deprive the bankruptcy courts of BAJA authority.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1976) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988)).
100. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 213, 92 Stat. 2549, 2661.
101. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(b)-(d), 92 Stat. 2549,
2682.
102. It is not clear that House Report 1418 represents the best indication of Congress's
intent. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
105. See infra section 11.B.2.a.
106. See infra section 11.B.2.b.
107. See infra section 11.B.2.c.
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Sections II.B.2.b and II.B.2.c argue that the 1985 and 1992 amendments to the EAJA definition of "court" do not preclude the inclusion of the bankruptcy court.
a. The repeal of the BRA. Congress repealed the BRA in response to the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. 108 The Marathon
Court held unconstitutional the bankruptcy courts' jurisdictional
authority under BRA section 241. Because the Court also held that
the unconstitutional portion of the jurisdictional grant was inseverable from the remainder of section 241, it struck down the entire
section.109 Congress responded with the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 {BAFJA).110 This section demonstrates that neither the Court's decision in Marathon nor the
terms of the BAFJA undermine bankruptcy court authority under
the EAJA.
The Supreme Court invalidated the BRA in Marathon on the
ground that bankruptcy courts cannot adjudicate questions of private rights. 111 The Marathon plurality noted, however, that matters
involving public rights could be adjudicated by federal tribunals
that lacked Article III protections. 112 The government creates a
public right when it waives its sovereign immunity and consents to
be sued,113 as it did in passing the EAJA. EAJA applications are
complaints against the government in an area where Congress has
full authority to waive sovereign immunity. EAJA applications

108. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). For discussion of the congressional repeal of the BRA, see Beeline Engg. & Constr., Inc. v. D'Espies, P.A. (In re Beeline Engg. & Constr., Inc.), 154 B.R.
790, 791 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Nieves v. Melendez (In re Melendez), 153 B.R. 386, 389 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1993}; Walter J. Taggart, The New Bankruptcy Court System, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231,
232-37 (1985).
109. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 87 n.40.
110. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified at scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.
and 28 U.S.C.).
111. 458 U.S. at 83-84. In Marathon, the debtor, the Northern Pipeline Construction Co.
sued the Marathon Pipeline Co. in the bankruptcy court to recover damages for breach of
contract and warranty. The Court found no applicable exception to the general rule that the
judicial power of the United States must be exercised by an Article III tribunal. Marathon,
458 U.S. at 70-71. The Supreme Court later stated its holding in Marathon as follows:
The Court's holding ... establishes only that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III
court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to appellate review.
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985).
112. One of the exceptions to the general rule that the judicial power of the United States
must be exercised by an Article III tribunal is that Congress may assign questions of public
rights to non-Article III bodies. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 67-70; Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279
U.S. 438, 452 (1929).
113. 458 U.S. at 67-69.
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therefore qualify as public rights which may be adjudicated by nonArticle III bodies, including the bankruptcy courts.114
In Marathon, the Court also ruled that the unconstitutional aspects of BRA section 241 were not severable from the remainder of
the Act. 115 This effectively invalidated the entire BRA. Thus, due
to Marathon's invalidation of section 241 in its entirety, including
the "pass through" jurisdiction from the district courts to the bankruptcy courts, the bankruptcy courts no longer exercised power
identical to the district courts in title 11 cases.116 The Supreme
Court left the onus on Congress to reconstitute the bankruptcy
courts.117
Congress passed the BAFJA to remedy the constitutional deficiencies of the BRA identified by the Court in Marathon.11 8 Under
the BAFJA, the bankruptcy court would have jurisdiction over title
11 cases but would not be a "court of the United States." 119 The
BAFJA took effect June 27, 1984.120
Although the Eleventh Circuit held, in effect, that the BAFJA's
elimination of "court of the United States" status for the bankruptcy courts removed BAJA jurisdiction from the bankruptcy
courts,121 it is likely that Congress was completely unaware that the
BAFJA amendments affected the EAJA. Even if congressional researchers examined every statutory cross-reference to section 451
114. See Anthony M. Sabino, "And Unequal Justice for All"- Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 453, 483 (1992).
115. The Court stated:
As part of a comprehensive restructuring of the bankruptcy laws, Congress has vested
jurisdiction over this and all matters related to cases under Title 11 in a single non-Art.
III court, and has done so pursuant to a single statutory grant of jurisdiction. In these
circumstances we cannot conclude that if Congress were aware that the grant of jurisdiction could not constitutionally encompass this and similar claims, it would simply remove
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over these matters, leaving the jurisdictional
provision and the adjudicatory structure intact with respect to other types of claims, and
thus subject to Art. III constitutional challenge on a claim-by-claim basis.
Marathon, 458 U.S. at 87 n.40. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred in this analysis to
create a six-justice majority for this position. 458 U.S. at 91-92.
116. Recall that §§ 241 and 405 had granted the bankruptcy.courts all the jurisdiction
held by the district courts in cases under title 11. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying
text.
117. 458 U.S. at 88. The Court stayed its ruling until October 4, 1982, to allow Congress
to create a new bankruptcy system. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 88. The Court later extended the
stay to December 24, 1982. 459 U.S. 813 (1982).
118. Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice,
the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. LEGJS. 1, 1 (1985).
119. The BAFJA contained a section which provided, "Section 402(b) of the [BRA] is
amended by striking out 'shall take effect June 28, 1984' and inserting in lieu thereof 'shall
not be effective.'" Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, § 113, 98 Stat. 333, 343. The BRA amendment to § 451 was thereby canceled.
120. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 122(c), 98 Stat. 333, 346.
121. Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990).
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of title 28 - which the BRA had amended to include the bankruptcy courts - before amending that section in the BAFJA, they
would not have been directed to the EAJA because the EAJA itself
contains no cross-reference to section 451.122 Furthermore, the legislative history of the BAFJA gives no indication that Congress was
aware that the enactment of the BAFJA affected other statutes.1 23
Absent clear evidence that Congress intended wide-reaching effects
in other statutes when it replaced section 1471 of the BRA, one
should not conclude that Congress intended for the BAFJA to take
EAJA authority from the bankruptcy courts.124
It is important to recognize that the issue is not whether the
bankruptcy courts are appropriately considered "courts of the
United States" as defined in section 451. The real question is
whether the bankruptcy courts can exercise BAJA authority.1zs
The questions are distinct. The group of courts included in section
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988). Recall that the Eleventh Circuit linked the EAJA to
section 451 through the EAJA's reference to costs enumerated in section 1920. See supra
notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
123. See STATEMENTS OF LEGISLATIVE LEADERS, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576606; H. CoNF. REP. No. 882, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (setting out text of BAFJA without
analysis).
124. The notion that a change in prior law should not be presumed absent an express
intent to make a change is a familiar one. See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 627
(11th Cir.) ("It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that implying the repeal, either in
whole or by a narrowing in scope, of one statute by the passage of a subsequent statute is
disfavored and should be condoned only when Congress' intent to repeal is manifest." (cita·
tions omitted)), cerl denied, 499 U.S. 979 (1990). In the bankruptcy context, courts often
interpret the 1978 bankruptcy code to preserve the law of the prior system except in areas in
which Congress expressly indicated that a change was intended. See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm,
112 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992); United Sav. Assn. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S.
365, 380 (1988). Because there is considerable ambiguity regarding the current law, as
demonstrated by the split between the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, and because there is no
direct evidence that Congress intended a change in the scope of the EAJA when it passed
BAFJA, the pre-BAFJA regime of bankruptcy court authority over EAJA questions should
continue.
125. Some commentators, however, consider the § 451 question crucial. See, e.g., Sabino,
supra note 114, at 483-84. But the courts that consider the current language of § 451 determinative for the purposes of the EAJA and its sister statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988), make
the mistake of failing to consider § 451 in its historical context. Ninth Circuit caselaw demonstrates the confusion that may be wrought by this error. In Perroton v. Gray (In re Perroton), 958 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit held that a bankruptcy court was not a
"court of the United States" as defined within § 451 of title 28 for the purpose of ruling on an
in forma pauperis petition. Perroton, 958 F.2d at 896. Later, in IRS v. Germaine (In re
Germaine), 152 B.R. 619 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993), a Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
held that the bankruptcy courts were "court[s] of the United States" for the purpose of ruling
on a 26 U.S.C. § 7430 petition to shift fees. Germaine, 152 B.R. at 626-27. The Germaine
panel distinguished Perroton on the grounds that the definition of the phrase "court of the
United States" included in title 28 did not apply to § 7430 of title 26. Because § 7430 was
based on the EAJA, see supra note 47, which is included in title 28, this reasoning appears
suspect. To complicate matters further, a federal district court in the Ninth Circuit has ruled
that bankruptcy courts may not shift fees under § 7430. United States v. Yochum (In re
Yochum), 156 B.R. 816 (D. Nev. 1993). The Yochum court stated it was not bound by the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision in Germaine and believed the decision in Perroton
compelled its result. Yochum, 156 B.R. at 818 & n.2.
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451 is a subset of those courts eligible to shift fees under the BAJA,
as demonstrated by the inclusion of the United States Court of
Claims and the United States Court of Veterans Appeals,126 even
though those courts are not listed in section 451.127 If Congress's
intent in passing the BAJA was to grant authority to the bankruptcy
courts only because they were expected to be "courts of the United
States" and enjoyed the equivalent of district court jurisdiction
under the BRA and were therefore qualified to exercise BAJA
power, then it is true that the Marathon decision and the enactment
of BAFJA would have stripped the bankruptcy courts of BAJA
power. If, however, Congress intended to grant BAJA authority to
the bankruptcy courts regardless of their status as "courts of the
United States," then the limitation in House Report 1418 is merely
descriptive rather than defining, as section 451 was meant to include the bankruptcy courts. In that case, the developments catalyzed by Marathon should not alter the original intent of Congress,
which was to give the bankruptcy courts BAJA power.12s
The BAJA itself provides convincing evidence that Congress did
not believe that only the "courts of the United States" as defined in
section 451 were qualified to enforce the BAJA. Beyond granting
fee-shifting power "in any civil action" to "any court having jurisdiction of that action," 129 the statute also grants fee-shifting authority to "[a]n agency that conducts an adversary adjudication." 130 An
agency that conducts an adversary adjudication is not a "court of
the United States." 131 Congress's willingness to allow BAJA fee
shifting by administrative agencies strongly suggests that fee-shifting authority should not depend upon status as a "court of the
United States."
The inclusion of agency adjudicative bodies among those empowered to shift fees also demonstrates that, for BAJA purposes,
there is no substantive significance in section 451's list of courts.
One need not be appointed by the President and confirmed by
Congress for a life term to be judicially qualified to enforce the
126. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F) (Supp. IV 1992).
127. See 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988).
128. See supra section Il.B.1. Absent the ruling in Marathon, the bankruptcy courts
would have exercised EAJA power both during the transition period as a result of the passthrough jurisdiction from the district courts included in § 241 of the BRA, see supra notes 7886 and accompanying text, and after the full enactment of the BRA in 1984, due to the
jurisdiction granted in § 241 as well as the proposed amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 451. See
supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
129. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, § 204, 94 Stat. 2321, 2328
(1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(a) (1988)).
130. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, § 203, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325
(1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988)).
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988) (providing separate definitions of agency and court of the
United States).
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EAJA. By allowing non-Article III administrative agencies to adjudicate EAJA claims, Congress has effectively stated that BAJA issues are matters of public rights, eligible to be decided by nonArticle III courts.132
b. The 1985 amendments to the EAJA. In 1985, Congress
amended the EAJA's definition of "court" to include the U.S.
Claims Court.133 One commentator, relying on the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius - the expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another134 - suggests that courts should interpret
the inclusion of the Claims Court in the 1985 amendment to exclude the bankruptcy courts.135 Courts should reject this argument
for three reasons. First, the language of the 1985 amendment simply does not lend itself to interpretation under expressio unius. The
1985 amendment to the BAJA definition of court provides that the
EAJA definition of court includes the Claims Court.136 According
to the Supreme Court, "the term 'including' is not one of all-embracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative application of
the general principle."137 Therefore, expressio unius ought not apply to an illustrative list signaled by the operative verb includes.
The 1985 amendment to include the Claims Court - a non-Article
III court - in the EAJA definition of court represented an "illustrative application of the general principle" 138 that BAJA's refer132. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-70
(1982) (holding that Congress may create administrative bodies with authority to adjudicate
"public rights" but not "private rights").
133. Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 2(c), 99 Stat. 183, 185 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(2)(f) (1988)).
134. "Under [expressio unius], if a statute specifies one exception to a general rule or
assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
135. Sabino, supra note 114, at 485-86. Professor Sabino, after concluding that "[t]here
appears to be enough elasticity in the statutory scheme to include the bankruptcy courts in
the definition of 'courts of the United States,' " id. at 485, states that the only logical conclusion to be drawn from Congress's failure to amend the EAJA to include the bankruptcy
courts "is that Congress did not intend to imbue the bankruptcy court with jurisdiction under
the EAJA." Id. at 485-86. Section II.A of this Note showed that the original intent of Congress was to include the bankruptcy courts, a point with which Sabino seemingly agrees. See
id. at 463 n.61 (citing Reuben B. Robertson & Mary C. Fowler, Recovering Attorneys' Fees
from the Government Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 56 TuL. L. REV. 903, 904 n.7
(1982) (noting that the pre-BAFJA version of § 451 was to include the bankruptcy courts)).
Relying on the 1985 amendment to the EAJA, Sabino then argues, however, that the subsequent intent and actions of Congress stripped EAJA authority from the bankruptcy courts.
Sabino, supra note 114, at 485-86; see also Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899
F.2d 1136, 1139 n.7 (11th Cir.) ("Congress's failure to make any similar clarifying amendment
with regard to the Tax Court or the bankruptcy courts supports the continuing vitality of
Bowen."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990).
136. After the 1985 amendment, the EAJA provided, " 'court' includes the United States
Claims Court." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F) (1988).
137. Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941); cf. 11 U.S.C.
§ 102(3) (1988).
138. See supra text accompanying note 137.
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ence to "any court" plainly includes non-Article III courts. Thus a
court need not be listed in section 451 as a "court of the United
States'' to exercise EAJA authority properly.139
Second, the expressio unius doctrine should not apply given the
EAJA's legislative background. The doctrine assumes that all alternatives not elected were considered and rejected,1 4o an assumption
that cannot be supported in this case. Although some commentators criticize the use of the doctrine on this ground generally,141 its
use is especially questionable in this instance, because the legislative history indicates that the 1985 amendment was a particularized
response to confusion concerning the scope of EAJA jurisdiction in
the Claims Court,142 not a comprehensive review of EAJA jurisdiction. No general principle applicable to the bankruptcy courts
should be drawn from such specific action.143
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the legislative history to
the 1985 amendment states that the amendment is merely a clarification, rather than a change, in the existing law.144 The legislative
history indicates that Congress used the 1985 amendment to respond to misinterpretations of the EAJA,145 suggesting that the
1985 amendment was a legislative interpretation of the EAJA
rather than an act of lawmaking that might support an expressio
139. See also supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
140. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 813 (1983) (expressio unius "would make sense only if all
omissions in legislative drafting were deliberate").
141. See, e.g., Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 874 (1930)
("The first comment on [expressio unius] is that it is not true.... [Expressio unius] illustrates
one of the most fatuously simple of logical fallacies ...."); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2109 n.182 (1990) ("[The expressio
unius] canon is a questionable one in light of the dubious reliability of inferring specific intent
from silence.").
142. H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 17-18 (1985), reprinted in 1985
U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 146 (citing Bailey v. United States, 721F.2d357 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting
the government's withdrawal of its objection on appeal to the Claims Court's authority to
hear the EAJA dispute in light of the decision in Ellis v. United States, 711F.2d1571 (Fed.
Cir. 1983))); see also Ellis, 711 F.2d at 1573-75 (holding that the non-Article III Claims Court
inherits EAJA authority from its Article III predecessor, the Court of Claims).
143. One commentator has noted that legislatures often respond discretely to particular
problems:
A legislature typically acts only when and as someone presses it to act. Hence it is likely
to deal at one point of time with less than the whole, potential extent of the issues or
choices it confronts. Thus, legislative intent may emerge in full definition only through a
succession of acts.
HURST, supra note 75, at 61.
144. H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 142, at 17-18, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 146;
see also Charles E. Grassley, Congress Wants a Wide Reaching EAJA, ABA J., Mar. 1985, at
40, 44 ("[T]he [1985 amendments to] the EAJA do not expand the act; they clarify the intent
of Congress in enacting the legislation in 1980.").
145. See H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 142, at 9, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 137
("Part of the problem in implementing the Act has been that agencies and courts are misconstruing the Act.").
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unius analysis. Moreover, in 1985, no confusion or conflicting
caselaw existed concerning the applicability of the BAJA to the
bankruptcy courts.146 Because Congress merely sought to clarify
existing law and no dispute had arisen concerning the bankruptcy
courts' jurisdiction, there was no reason for Congress to address the
issue in the 1985 amendment.
c. The 1992 amendment to the EAJA. As with the 1985 amendment to the BAJA, the 1992 amendment to the definition of court
does not support the exclusion of the bankruptcy courts from
BAJA jurisdiction. The 1992 amendment includes the U.S. Court
of Veterans Appeals in the EAJA definition of court. 141 Although
the 1992 amendment appears to provide additional support for the
expressio unius argument, the amendment provides no more evidence of a congressional intent to exclude the bankruptcy courts
from BAJA authority than does the similar 1985 amendment. In
the legislative history of the 1992 amendment, Congress again emphasized that the amendment was a response to a particular court
opinion,148 and that the amendment was merely a clarification of
existing law.149
The 1992 BAJA amendment was a response to Jones v. Derwinski, 150 in which the U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals held that it
lacked authority to award EAJA fees because Congress did not intend for the cpurt to have BAJA authority. 151 As with the bankruptcy courts, however, the plain meaning of "any court" in the
BAJA's jurisdictional provision indicates that the statute should
have covered the Court of Veterans Appeals.152 The legislative history of the 1992 amendment underscores this point by emphasizing
that the amendment was merely a clarification of existing law, not a
146. Prior to 1986, only five opinions discuss the EAJA in the context of the bankruptcy
courts. Not one of those cases suggests that the bankruptcy courts are ineligible to exercise
EAJA authority. See United States Small Business Admin. v. Esmond (In re Esmond), 752
F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1985) (remanding to bankruptcy court for a determination of propriety of
EAJA award); Hagan v. Heckler (In re Hagan), 44 B.R. 59 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1984) (exercising
EAJA power); In re Parks, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 'lI 9744 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)
(reaching the merits of EAJA dispute); In re Newlin, 29 B.R. 781 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (affirming
EAJA award by bankruptcy court); see also In re Conti, 50 B.R. 142, 147 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1985) (stating, in dicta and although no EAJA petition was before the court, that it would be
appropriate for the bankruptcy court to award EAJA fees).
147. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 506(a), 106 Stat.
4506, 4513.
148. See Jones v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 231 (Ct. Vet. App. 1992) (holding the Court of
Veterans Appeals unable to shift fees under the EAJA), vacated sub nom. Jones v. Principi,
985 F.2d 582 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (vacating judgment in light of the 1992 EAJA amendment).
149. H.R. REP. No. 1006, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3921, 3934 ("[The amendment] amends EAJA and clarifies that it applies to the Court of
Veterans Appeals.").
150. 2 Vet. App. 231 (Ct. Vet. App. 1992).
151. Jones, 2 Vet. App. at 233-34.
152. See supra section 11.B.1.
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change in law.153 The House Judiciary Committee, by classifying
the amendment as a clarification rather than a change in law, suggests that the amendment is an example of the proper interpretation of the meaning of "court" within the EAJA. 154 Thus once
again, the expressio unius doctrine should not apply because no evidence of a comprehensive review of the scope of the BAJA exists.
To the contrary, Congress again opted for a narrow solution rather
than considering other possible ambiguities in BAJA jurisdiction,155
even though the circuit split regarding bankruptcy jurisdiction had
developed. 156 Endowing this process with the presumption of careful consideration and exclusion of all other possible amendments
makes little sense in light of the actual record.
The better explanation of the 1985 and 1992 amendments is that
they are examples of Congress' clarifying the existing law by correcting court decisions that took the wrong path. As such, both the
1985 and 1992 amendments may be categorized as legislative interpretations of the BAJA that serve to emphasize the broad reach of
the BAJA.
C. Purposes of the EAJA
Examining the purposes of the EAJA provides further support
for the conclusion that the bankruptcy courts have fee-shifting authority - a conclusion already reached through textual analysis
and a review of the legislative history. This section examines four
purposes of the BAJA - encouraging private litigants to assert
their legal rights against the government despite the government's
overwhelming resource advantage, providing for equality among litigants, establishing a check on government power, and encouraging
a testing ground for government positions157 - and concludes that
153. H.R. REP. No. 1006, supra note 149, at 25 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3934.
154. See id.
155. See supra note 143.
156. The speed with which Congress passed the amendment and the fact that the legislative history consists of only one paragraph relevant to the EAJA suggests that Congress did
not comprehensively review the scope of the EAJA in conjunction with the 1992 amendment.
Only slightly more than seven months passed between the decision in Jones v. Derwinski, 2
Vet. App. 231, 231 (Ct. Vet. App. 1992), decided March 13, and the enactment of the amendment on October 29, 1992. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub L. No. 102-572,
106 Stat. 4506. The relevant legislative history is included in H.R. REP. No. 1006, supra note
149, at 25, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3934.
157. According to the EAJA,
"position of the United States" means, in addition to the position taken by the United
States in the civil action, the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil
action is based; except that fees and expenses may not be awarded to a party for any
portion of the litigation in which the party has unreasonably protracted the proceedings
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granting BAJA authority to bankruptcy courts furthers each of
these purposes.
1. Reducing the Deterrent Effect of Government Resources on
the Average Litigant

Bankruptcy court jurisdiction under the EAJA is consistent with
the EAJA's purpose of providing a check on the coercive potential
of the government's tremendous resources. In enacting the EAJA,
Congress voiced specific concern that the government bureaucracy,
with its greater resources and expertise, could practically coerce
other litigants to comply with its regulatory or litigation position.158
The BAJA provides, "It is the purpose of this title - (1) to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against,
governmental action .... "159 The Supreme Court has summarized
the statute's deterrent rationale as follows:
"For many citizens, the costs of securing vindication of their rights
and the inability to recover attorneys fees preclude resort to the adjudicatory process. . . . When the cost of contesting a Government order, for example, exceeds the amount at stake, a party has no realistic
choice and no effective remedy. In these cases, it is more practical to
endure an injustice than to contest it." The EAJA was designed to
rectify this situation.160

Congress was particularly concerned that small businesspersons
were being forced to submit to the government due to the costs of
establishing their rights against a bigger, better financed, more experienced adversary.1 61 In congressional debate, Senator Goldwater said: "[T]his glaring inequity of current law is an
encouragement to governmental arbitrariness. What hope does a
small citizen or business have to challenge all the resources of the
mighty Federal Government when even if he wins the administrative or judicial decision, his legal fees virtually leave him in bank28 U.S.C. § 2412{d)(2){D) {1988). Essentially, this means that both the litigation position as
well as prelitigation conduct comprise the "position of the United States." See Cummings v.
Sullivan, 950 F.2d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 1991).
158. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4988
("Thus, at the present time, the Government with its greater resources and expertise can in
effect coerce compliance with its position.").
159. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, § 202{c), 94 Stat. 2321, 2325
{1980).
160. Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 883 (1989) (quoting S. REP. No. 253, supra note 88,
at 5).
161. Four members of Congress spoke in favor of the EAJA because small businesses
were being forced toward bankruptcy while attempting to establish their rights against the
government. 126 CoNG. REc. 28,643 (1980) (statements of Rep. Smith, Rep. Railsback, and
Rep. McDade); 126 CoNG. REc. 28,653 (1980) (statement of Rep. Symms). The concern for
small businesses is also evident throughout the report of the House Committee on Small
Business. H.R. REP. No. 1005, supra note 88, at 5-8, 11.

June 1994]

Note -

Equal Access to Justice Act

2275

ruptcy?" 162 Senator Baldus echoed this sentiment, stating, "[I]t is a
terrifying prospect now of fighting a court case, winning, and yet,
going bankrupt."163 In short, Congress recognized the vulnerability
of the small business and provided a remedy for situations in which
the taxpayer would be economically defeated even when legally victorious. It is illogical to assume that Congress intended to protect
citizens from being driven to the brink of bankruptcy, only to abandon them at the threshold of title 11.164
The filing of a bankruptcy petition does not obviate the need for
BAJA protection. If the bankruptcy is in the reorganization stage,
the debtor in possession has all the same motivations and influences
as a prebankruptcy owner involved in a district court case,165 except
that the debtor has fewer resources with which to work. The likelihood of acquiescence to an unreasonable government position is
even greater in bankruptcy than in administrative hearings or other
civil actions in federal court because the nongovernment party typically has fewer resources than litigants in other civil actions to withstand the economic pressure inherent in litigating against the
government.166 The economic condition of the debtor only magnifies the government's coercive power. The presence, in the bankruptcy courts, of the precise danger that Congress expressly sought

162. 125 CoNG. REc. 21,438 {1979) (statement of Sen. Goldwater).
163. 126 CoNG. REc. 28,654 {1980) (statement of Rep. Baldus).
164. Cf. SuUivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 {1988). In Sullivan, the Court awarded EAJA
fees to a Social Security claimant for expenses incurred in an administrative proceeding in
which the United States was not represented by an attorney, 490 U.S. at 892-93, notwithstanding the fact that the EAJA only allows for an award of fees in administrative hearings
when the position of the United States is represented by counsel or otherwise. 5 U.S.C.
§ 504{b){l){C) {1988). In support of its holding, the Court reasoned that "we find it difficult
to ascribe to Congress an intent to throw the Social Security claimant a lifeline that it knew
was a foot short." 490 U.S. at 890. It is equally difficult to ascribe such a congressional intent
regarding a bankrupt claimant, especially in light of the concern for small business repeatedly
expressed in the congressional debate. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
165. The debtors in possession "bring to the bankruptcy court their old allegiances and
antagonisms, as well as their business judgment and experience." JAMES J. WHITE & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, BANKRUPTCY 64 {2d ed. 1992). This is not to say that the actual prefiling
disputes the debtor in possession may have had with the government Will be adjudicated by
the bankruptcy court. Those disputes will likely be postponed by the automatic stay. See 11
U.S.C. § 362 {1988). The debtor in possession faced with a bankruptcy dispute against the
federal government is, however, subject to the same pressures that Congress believed were
deterring citizens from asserting their legal rights. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 5,
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4984.
166. Although the debtor enjoys some procedural advantages, such as the automatic stay,
see 11 U.S.C. § 362 {1988), that are designed to reduce the economic pressure inherent in
bankruptcy, the automatic stay does nothing to reduce the pressure inherent in a violation of
the stay, an action to lift the stay, or an objection to the debtor's use of cash collateral by the
government. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 {1988). Application of the EAJA would encourage a
debtor to litigate these issues, confident that if the government acted without substantial
justification, the debtor will not suffer a loss solely by asserting its rights.
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to prevent through the BAJA167 emphasizes the need to interpret
the BAJA correctly to resolve this situation.
2. Placing Litigants on Equal Footing
In enacting the BAJA, Congress sought to remove the federal
government's sovereign immunity with respect to attorney's fees. 168
Before Congress passed the BAJA in 1980, courts could not shift
fees against the United States without explicit statutory authority.169 The government was therefore immune to many statutory
fee-shifting laws and common law exceptions to the American rule
to which its citizens were subject. Congress enacted the BAJA specifically to put the government on equal footing with other litigants
already subject to fee-shifting rules.17°
Absent BAJA authority the bankruptcy courts have the power
to award fees and costs when appropriate, but not against the federal government.171 By enacting the BAJA, Congress changed this
167. See O'Connor v. United States Dept. of Energy, 942 F.2d 771, 774 {10th Cir. 1991)
(noting that a grant of EAJA authority to the bankruptcy court is congruous with the EAJA
purpose of encouraging individuals to challenge government action).
168. The EAJA provides: "It is the purpose of this title - ... (2) to insure the applicability in actions by or against the United States of the common law and statutory exceptions
to the 'American Rule' respecting the award of attorney fees." Equal Access to Justice Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, § 202(c), 94 Stat. 2321, 2325 {1980).
169. The text of 28 U.S.C. § 2412 in 1976 was as follows:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as enumerated
in § 1920 of this title but not including the fees and expenses of attorneys may be
awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United
States or any agency or official of the United States acting in his official capacity, in any
court having jurisdiction of such action.
28 U.S.C. § 2412 {1976). For an interpretation of that section, see Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 265-68 (1975) (holding that pre-EAJA § 2412 barred
fee awards against the federal government unless the award was expressly authorized by
statute). Some of the statutory exceptions to the American rule are listed in supra note 4.
170. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1988)).
171. Without EAJA authority, bankruptcy courts would be prevented from shifting fees
and costs against the federal government in situations in which they could shift fees and costs
against a private litigant. These limitations arise in at least four contexts. First, bankruptcy
rule 7054 allows courts to shift costs to prevailing parties unless prohibited by law. See FED.
R. BANKR. P. 7054{b). The opposite presumption applies to the federal government, as costs
may be shifted against the federal government only to the extent permitted by law. Id. One
bankruptcy court has even held that costs available under rule 7054 include attorney's fees.
See Jn re Roco Corp., 37 B.R. 770, 775 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1984). Bankruptcy rule 7054 mirrors
federal rule of civil procedure 54. Civil procedure rule 54, like bankruptcy rule 7054, allows
courts to shift costs, but not against the United States unless there is a specific statutory
authorization. FED. R. C1v. P. 54{d). The EAJA and its 1966 predecessor, Act of July 18,
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-507, 80 Stat. 308 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976)), provide the
statutory basis for an award of costs, see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1988), and fees, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412{b) (1988). Therefore, without EAJA power, the bankruptcy courts are unable to put
the federal government on equal footing with other litigants.
Second, bankruptcy courts can impose sanctions of costs and attorney's fees against a
litigant or its attorney for a violation of bankruptcy rule 9011. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
Bankruptcy rule 9011 incorporates civil procedure rule 11. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11; see, e.g., In
re Rainbow Magazine, Inc., 136 B.R. 545 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1992). Bankruptcy rule 9011 ap-
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system in the federal courts,172 declaring that "there appears to be
no justification for exempting the United States" from exceptions
plies to "(e]very petition, pleading, motion and other paper served or filed in a [bankruptcy]
case ••. on behalf of a party represented by an attorney, except a list, schedule, (or] statement." FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011. Despite the pervasive effect of rule 9011 on nongovernment litigants, bankruptcy courts may not sanction the federal government under rule 9011
because the rule is not sufficiently explicit to waive sovereign immunity. See Graham v.
United States (In re Graham), 981 F.2d 1135, 1140 (10th Cir. 1992).
Third, the bankruptcy code provides that collection efforts regarding discharged debts are
permanently enjoined. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1988). Debtors may recover damages, including
attorney's fees, if the injunction is violated. Kimco Leasing, Inc. v. Knee, 144 B.R. 1001, 1003
(N.D. Ind. 1992); In re Rosteck, 85 B.R. 73 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988). Section 106 of the bankruptcy code, the general waiver of sovereign immunity, does not waive immunity with respect
to damage suits resulting from a governmental violation of the permanent injunction. 11
U.S.C. § 106 (1988); see also IRS v. Germaine (In re Germaine), 152 B.R. 619, 623 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1993) (holding that 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988), the EAJA's sister statute, did waive
sovereign immunity).
Finally, the bankruptcy courts cannot put the government on equal footing with respect to
violations of the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). The Bankruptcy Code provides
that an individual injured by a willful violation of the automatic stay may recover, among
other things, costs and attorney's fees incurred because of the violation. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(h) (1988).
Courts are split regarding whether the general waiver of sovereign immunity in bankruptcy code § 106 applies to § 362(h). Some courts hold that the general waiver is applicable,
see United States v. Bulson (In re Bulson), 117 B.R. 537, 541 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990); Price v.
United States (In re Price), 130 B.R. 259, 267-68 (N.D. Ill. 1991), while others contend that
sovereign immunity bars a monetary award under § 362(h). See United States v. Academy
Answering Serv., Inc. (In re Academy Answering Serv., Inc.), 100 B.R. 327, 329-30 (N.D.
Ohio 1989); Davis v. IRS, 136 B.R. 414, 415 (E.D. Va. 1992) (holding that Congress waived
the government's sovereign immunity in § 106, but only to the extent of the government's
claim against the estate; actual money damages are precluded).
The Supreme Court has emphasized that § 106 is not a complete waiver of sovereign
immunity. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011 {1992); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 {1989). Waivers of sovereign immunity must
be "unequivocally expressed," Nordic Village, 112 S. Ct. at 1014, and are to be strictly construed. 112 S. Ct. at 1015. The Court has not clarified the specific question of whether a
§ 362{h) claim for damages resulting from a violation of the automatic stay against the federal government is precluded by sovereign immunity. Differing interpretations of Nordic
Village have led to opposite results. See Pinkstaff v. United States (In re Pinkstaff), 974 F.2d
113, 115 (9th Cir. 1992) (sovereign immunity is waived by 11 U.S.C. § 106{a)); University
Medical Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re University Medical Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1068 {3d Cir. 1992)
(sovereign immunity is waived by 11U.S.C.§106{a)); Quillen v. United States, 160 B.R. 776,
777 (W.D. Va. 1993) (sovereign immunity bars recovery of fees against the United States);
Nichols v. IRS (In re Nichols), 143 B.R. 104, 105-07 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (§ 106 only
waives sovereign immunity if the government has filed a proof of claim against the estate); In
re Stuber, 142 B.R. 435, 438-39 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992) (sovereign immunity bars recovery of
fees against the United States); Taborski v. United States, 141 B.R. 959, 964 {N.D. Ill. 1992)
(sovereign immunity is waived by 11 U.S.C. § 106{a)); Toti v. United States (In re Toti), 141
B.R. 126, 131-33 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992) (sovereign immunity bars recovery offees against
United States), revel on other grounds, 149 B.R. 829 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
One court has resolved this problem by relying on the EAJA. See In re Schafer, 146 B.R.
477 (D. Kan. 1992). The court held that EAJA § 2412(b) was a waiver of sovereign immunity
that allowed a bankruptcy court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing debtor even though
§ 106 provided no such waiver. Schafer, 146 B.R. at 481. The Schafer court cited O'Connor
as binding Tenth Circuit precedent to support bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the EAJA,
but did not acknowledge the circuit split. 146 B.R. at 481.
172. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 9, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4987 (noting that the United States should be held to at least the same standards in litigation as private
parties).
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to the American rule. 173 This reasoning applies as much to the
bankruptcy courts as to other federal courts.
The BAJA purpose of eliminating the federal government's sovereign immunity with respect to litigation costs is also consistent
with the waiver of sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy code.174
When the government acts as a litigant rather than in its sovereign
capacity, there is no need to extend sovereign immunity.11s Congress's decision to hold government parties to the same standards as
other litigants176 recognizes that government parties that act without substantial justification, like the Farmers Home Administration
in Davis,111 or the IRS,178 have no special right to immunity based
on their status as governmental units. The reasons for removing the
federal government's sovereign immunity with respect to attorney
fees are therefore as compelling in the bankruptcy court as in other
federal courts vested with EAJA jurisdiction.
3. Deterrence of Unjustified Government Action
Congress enacted the BAJA in part to deter unjustified government action in bringing and litigating lawsuits.179 Including the
173. Id.
174. See 11 U.S.C. § 106 {1988).
175. The Supreme Court has held the EAJA is subject to a narrow interpretation as a
waiver of sovereign immunity. Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 520-21 (1991). Of course,
the corollary to the general rule concerning waivers of immunity is that a court should not
construe a waiver more narrowly than Congress intended it. Ardestani, 112 S. Ct. at 520. As
demonstrated earlier, when the EAJA was passed, Congress intended for the bankruptcy
courts to exercise EAJA jurisdiction. See supra section II.B.1. Therefore, the rule requiring
a narrow construction of the EAJA does not exclude the bankruptcy courts from EAJA
jurisdiction.
Additionally, some have argued the doctrine of sovereign immunity is inapplicable to the
EAJA. See Thomas W. Holm, Note, Aliens' Alienation from Justice: The Equal Access to
Justice Act Should Apply to Deportation Proceedings, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1185, 1217-19 (1991);
Arlene S. Ragozin, Comment, The Waiver of Immunity in the Equal Access to Justice Act:
Clarifying Opaque Language, 61 WASH. L. REv. 217, 238-41 (1986). Because the purpose of
the rule requiring a narrow construction of waivers of sovereign immunity is to protect public
funds and allow for discretion in legitimate government action, and because the EAJA reflects the legislature's judgment regarding the proper balancing of both those factors, the
EAJA should not be subject to the rule requiring narrow construction of waivers of sovereign
immunity. See Ardestan~ 112 S. Ct. at 525-26 {Blackmun, J., dissenting).
176. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
177. The claim of the Farmers Home Administration in Davis was equitably subordinated
because the agency's conduct toward other creditors was "at best, misleading." Gower v.
Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
981 {1990).
178. The IRS is a frequent violator of the bankruptcy code. See supra note 17.
179. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 14, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4993;
126 CoNG. REc. 28,845 {1980) (statement of Sen. Dominici) ("So I am quick to admit that,
while it is a bill intended to recompense the average American and the small businessman for
legal fees, it is also a bill which will begin to put some skids under arbitrary regulation and
rulemaking."); see also June Carbone, The Misguided Application of Traditional Fee Doctrine
to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 26 B.C. L. REv. 843, 874 (1985) ("In its methodology, the
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bankruptcy courts within EAJA jurisdiction serves this purpose. At
the time the EAJA was passed, Congress was concerned that government agencies sometimes abused their power.180 By putting
these government entities at risk for their opponent's attorney's
fees, 181 Congress hoped to curb the unreasonable exercise of government authority. This continues to be an important goal in bankruptcy, where excessive litigation often channels the estate's
resources to the attorneys, rather than to creditors and the
debtor. 182
4.

Testing Government Action

Prior to the enactment of the EAJA, Congress perceived that
many government positions went unc;:hallenged due to the high cost
of litigating against the government.183 As a result, the government
repeatedly asserted these positions although they were never legitimated through a hearing. 184 Congress was not only concerned
about untested government arguments; it also believed that, too
Act pays greater attention to the deterrent effect on federal agencies than to the vindication
of any single interest.").
180. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4988
("[T)here is evidence that small businesses are the target of agency action precisely because
they do not have the resources to fully litigate the issue."); S. REP. No. 253, supra note 88, at
5 n.1; 126 CoNG. REc. 28,649 (1980) (statement of Rep. Smith) ("The horror stories of Government actions brought without substantial justification are legion."); see also Commissioner v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 165 (1990) (noting that Congress passed the EAJA partially due
to a concern that government agencies were exercising their authority unreasonably).
181. Mandatory awards under EAJA § 2412(d) of fees and expenses incurred by the prevailing party are paid by the agency over which the private party prevailed. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(4) (1988). The assignment of responsibility for the fees under subsection (d) to the
department which lost the case was a late alteration to the bill to increase its deterrent effect.
See 126 CONG. REc. 28,845 (1980) (statement of Sen. Domenici) (stating that the earlier
version provided for payment from a general fund); National Legal Aid and Defender Assn.,
Commentary: The Equal Access to Justice Act, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1021, 1021 (1982)
("Awards made under section 2412(d) ... should be paid directly by the agency from its
unrestricted appropriation."). Discretionary awards under§§ 2412(a) and 2412(b) are paid
by the General Accounting Office. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(c), 2414 (1988).
182. Delay increases the administrative expenses generated by the bankruptcy estate. All
actual and necessary expenses of maintaining the estate are administrative, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 503 (1988), and are paid before creditors and the debtor receive any funds. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 507 (1988). Therefore, delay prevents maximal distribution of the estate, which is a goal of
the bankruptcy system. See WHITE & NIMMER, supra note 165, at 52.
183. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 9, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4988
(noting that "it is more practical to endure an injustice than to contest it" if the cost of
contesting is high).
184. See id. ("Where compliance is coerced, precedent may be established on the basis of
an uncontested order rather than the thoughtful presentation and consideration of opposing
views."); S. REP. No. 253, supra note 88, at 7 ("By allowing a decision to contest Government
action to be based on the merits of the case rather than the cost of litigating, [the EAJA)
helps assure that administrative decisions reflect informed deliberation."). Although the
danger of ill-conceived legal precedent is slim in the bankruptcy context because agencies do
not have rulemaking power in that arena, there is a risk of institutional precedent, where a
course of conduct may be established without informed deliberation. See id. at 7.
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often, government decisions to litigate went unchallenged. 185 Without the threat of challenges by citizens, governmental power was
only limited by its own discretion. Congress believed this was an
insufficient check on government authority.186 The citizens who do
challenge the government and force litigation thereby provide a
type of public service, especially when the government's position is
unjustified. 187 Granting the bankruptcy courts the ability to shift
fees under the BAJA will help test and thereby improve the quality
of government positions in bankruptcy cases.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO BANKRUPTCY COURT JURISDICTION
UNDER THE CURRENT BAJA
Three possible alternatives to bankruptcy court jurisdiction over
BAJA petitions exist. First, bankruptcy courts could forward proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning BAJA petitions to the district courts for final judgment.188 Second,
bankruptcy courts could obtain the consent of the parties to exercise BAJA power.18 9 Third, Congress could again amend the BAJA
definition of court.190
This Part argues that none of these options provides a solution
preferable to interpreting the BAJA accurately according to its language, history, and purposes. Section III.A argues that forwarding
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the
BAJA issue to the district court is inefficient, expensive, and runs
counter to the purposes of the BAJA. Section 111.B argues that
having the bankruptcy court request the consent of the parties to
the courts' exercise of BAJA authority is unworkable in practice.
185. Congress amended the EAJA in 1985 to state: " '[P]osition of the United States'
means, in addition to the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or
failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based.'' Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-80, § 2(c)(2), 99 Stat. 183, 185 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D)). The House
Judiciary explained the amendment as follows: "[T]he definition of 'position of the United
States' ... necessarily includes an evaluation of the facts that led the agency to bring the
action against the private party ••. .'' H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 142, at 13, reprinted in
1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 141. The legislative history to the enactment of the EAJA in 1980 also
indicates a desire to include the decision to bring suit within the realm of EAJA regulation.
See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4989-90.
186. One report states, "This kind of truncated justice undermines the integrity of the
decisionmaking process." H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 10, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4988; see also S. REP. No. 253, supra note 88, at 5.
187. S. REP. No. 253, supra note 88, at 5-6. In passing the EAJA, Congress expressed a
belief that those entities that provide this service and thereby help define the limits of federal
authority should not bear the cost of providing such an important service alone. H.R. REP.
No. 1418, supra note 2, at 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4988-89.
188. See Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (11th
Cir.), cert denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990); see also 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(l) (1988).
189. Davis, 899 F.2d at 1141-42.
190. See Sabino, supra note 114, at 487-89.
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Section IIl.C argues that simply waiting for Congress again to
amend the EAJA definition of court is unfaithful to the statute and
confuses the roles of the judiciary and the legislature. This Part
concludes that the lack of acceptable substitutes for direct bankruptcy jurisdiction over EAJA applications provides the final indication that Congress likely intended to include bankruptcy courts
within the EAJA's jurisdictional grant.·
A.

Forwarding Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law to the District Court for Approval

The Eleventh Circuit in Gower v. Farmers Home Administration
(In re Davis) 191 suggested that the bankruptcy courts may forward
EAJA petitions to the district court according to the procedure provided by 28 U.S.C. § 157.192 Under this procedure, bankruptcy
courts may forward proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law to the district court for de novo review. The procedure permits the district court, an Article III court unquestionably vested
with EAJA jurisdiction, to issue the final order regarding the fee
application. 193 This suggestion mirrors the system currently used
when "noncore" 19 4 disputes arise before the bankruptcy
191. 899 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990).
192. 899 F.2d at 1140-44; see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1988).
193. 899 F.2d at 1141.
194. See 28 U.S.C. 157(c) (1988). In a "noncore" proceeding, absent consent of the parties to bankruptcy court adjudication, 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (1988), the bankruptcy court
hears the case, but does not decide it The bankruptcy court submits proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo review of any finding to which
one of the parties objects. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(l) (1988). The district court then enters final
judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(l) (1988).
The Davis court refers to the EAJA application as a noncore proceeding, 899 F.2d at
1140-41. This holding coincides with the Davis court's finding that bankruptcy courts may
not award EAJA fees, but the conclusion that EAJA applications are not core proceedings is
not perfectly obvious. At least two courts have held that a request for fees under the EAJA's
sister statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988), is a core matter. See Kreidle v. Department of Treasury, IRS (In re Kreidle), 145 B.R. 1007, 1010 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992) (relying on 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(0) (1988)); In re Chambers, 140 B.R. 233, 238 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (relying on 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (1988)). Furthermore, the courts which have awarded EAJA fees
must have considered the application a core matter. See, e.g., O'Connor v. United States
Dept. of Energy, 942 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1991) (reversing denial of fees on jurisdictional
grounds); United States Small Business Admin. v. Esmond (In re Esmond), 752 F.2d 1106
(5th Cir. 1985) (remanding to bankruptcy court for a determination of the appropriateness of
an EAJA award). Given the language of28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(0), which designates "other
proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate" as core matters, and the fact
that EAJA petitions surely affect asset liquidation, the reasoning of the Kreidle court seems
to give the correct result.
Another way to consider the problem is to recognize that the distinction between core
and noncore is Congress's attempt to rectify the jurisdiction problem exposed in Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). See Robert L. Ordin
& Michael L. Cook, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Under the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, in BANKRUPTCY LmGATION MANUAL 1, 73 (Michael L. Cook ed.,
1991). For a discussion of Marathon, see supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text. As
demonstrated earlier, there is no constitutional objection to the bankruptcy court adjudicat-
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courts.195
Such a procedure presents two difficulties. First, it requires an
adjudication by a court that is one step removed from the parties
and the administration of the case. A court ruling on an BAJA
application must exercise considerable judgment. Courts may not
shift fees if the position of the United States was "substantially justified"196 or if "special circumstances make an award unjust."197 A
district court may not be able to perform an effective de novo review without firsthand information. The bankruptcy court, on the
other hand, is intimately familiar with the totality of the case, including the legal positions and conduct of the parties. The bankruptcy court is therefore the best judicial body to determine
whether an award is warranted. As a result, the de novo review
performed by the district court may amount to little more than a
rubber stamp of the bankruptcy court's proposed findings. 198 In
such an instance, the procedure serves no purpose but to increase
the legal costs. This result conflicts with one of the purposes of the
EAJA - to reduce the deterrent effect of legal fees on the average
citizen's willingness to litigate against the federal government.199
Second, requiring the district court to repeat the work of the
bankrµptcy court misuses judicial resources. Even if the district
court engages in a pro forma review of the bankruptcy court's findings, the procedure under section 157 of the bankruptcy code consumes judicial resources.200 The federal district courts are already
overburdened201 and should not be saddled with additional responing EAJA questions. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. Therefore, EAJA petitions should be considered core matters that bankruptcy courts can hear directly.
195. See generally DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 865-66 (1992).
196. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988).
197. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988).
198. See WHITE & NIMMER, supra note 165, at 97 ("In practice, one suspects de novo
review will be pro forma."); Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REv. 675, 681-82 (1985) ("In practical terms, however, the nonarticle III court's proposed findings and conclusions will be the findings and
conclusions. 'Consider' and 'review' will disintegrate into rubber stamped acceptances of the
bankruptcy court's findings and conclusions.").
199. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4984
("The bill rests on the premise that certain (parties] may be deterred from seeking review of,
or defending against unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved.");
125 CoNo. REc. 21,436 (1979) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("Ironically, it appears that American Justice has become too costly for the average American budget.").
200. On the notoriously complex nature of bankruptcy jurisdiction, see Steven W.
Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases, 61
AM. BANKR. LJ. 287, 299-302 (1993).
201. As of March 31, 1993, 220,633 civil cases were pending before the district courts,
slightly less than the 228,468 cases which were terminated in the 12 prior months combined.
WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 2. The number of suits pending before the district
courts was virtually unchanged from March 31, 1992. Id. at 19. Thus, the district courts face
approximately a full year's backlog of civil cases. For an analysis of the district court's criminal caseload, see infra note 202.
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sibilities better handled by the bankruptcy courts. Furthermore,
because of the busy schedules of the district courts, it is conceivable
that a request from a bankruptcy court for a de novo review could
linger indefinitely, particularly because under the mandate of the
Speedy Trial Act civil suits are relegated to second priority.202 In
addition, district courts rarely want to hear bankruptcy disputes.203
The resulting delay and aggravation to the courts caused by forwarding proposed findings to the district courts204 ill serves the purposes of the EAJA2os and the bankruptcy system.206
It is true that the bankruptcy system must tolerate the additional
expenses of this noncore adjudication process when the bankruptcy
court lacks constitutional authority to accommodate the mandate of
Marathon that "the power to adjudicate 'private rights' must be
vested in an Art[icle] III court." 207 But no such constitutional requirement exists with respect to EAJA motions. 208 Because Congress gave the bankruptcy courts EAJA authority in 1980,209 there
is no reason to endure the additional expense of forwarding EAJA
petitions to the district courts.
B. Obtaining the Consent of the Parties to Adjudication by the
Bankruptcy Court
Relying on the consent of the parties to ba:p.kruptcy court jurisdiction over EAJA petitions is an unworkable solution because a
government party, in furtherance of its self-interest, will likely
never give its consent.210 The EAJA requires the losing federal
agency to pay the litigation expenses of a prevailing nongovemment party unless the government can prove that its position was
202. Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-64 (1988) (requiring expedited procedures for
criminal trials). As of March 31, 1993, 46,358 criminal cases were pending in the district
courts. WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 34. During the prior twelve months, 43,698
criminal cases were terminated, id., suggesting a backlog of a full year.
203. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 21 (1992). In fact, the district
courts' distaste for bankruptcy cases is one of the reasons the bankruptcy courts were created
as a separate judicial body in the BRA. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5976. ·
204. One commentator identifies this procedure as a cause of expense and delay in bankruptcy proceedings. See Rhodes, supra note 200, at 299-302.
205. See supra section 11.C.
206. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
207. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 77 (1982).
208. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
209. See supra section 11.B.1.
210. Even the proponents of this view admit that it is unlikely to be used. Professor
Sabino writes, "while it is debatable whether any federal agency would consent to such an
exercise by the bankruptcy court, it is, nevertheless, feasible." Sabino, supra note 114, at 487.
In enacting the EAJA, however, Congress certainly intended that parties who litigate and
prevail against the government, when the government has no substantial justification for its
position, have more than a "feasible" remedy.
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substantially justified.211 Therefore, a government party that consents to bankruptcy court jurisdiction incurs additional risk for the
litigation costs of the opposing party, but receives no reward. With
nothing to gain, the government party would be foolish to consent
to the exercise of EAJA jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court.2 12
This alternative is untenable because it places the power to consent
to bankruptcy court authority with a party that will only harm itself
by exercising such authority.
C. Amending the EAJA Definition of Court
A third alternative is a congressional amendment to the EAJA
to include the bankruptcy courts within the BAJA definition of
court. Anthony Sabino argues that Congress should again amend
the EAJA to include the bankruptcy court within its definition of
court, 213 following the amendments that included the Claims Court
and the Court of Veterans Appeals.214 He reasons that "Congress
created the EAJA, thus, it is best suited to modify the BAJA to
address new dynamics in its application."21s
Although amending the EAJA's definition of court to include
the bankruptcy court would obviously solve the problem of the
EAJA's jurisdictional scope with respect to the bankruptcy courts,
the prospect of amendment does not alleviate the courts' responsibility to interpret the law as it is written. Congress cannot be expected to address every new dynamic in the application of each law
it has enacted.216 Congress' failure to respond to the circuit split on
the issue of bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the BAJA may simply be the result of a need to focus on more pressing matters.
211. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(5) (1988). The government party bears the burden of proof
on this issue. Gutierrez v. Sullivan, 953 F.2d 579, 584-85 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2064 (1993); Cummings v. Sullivan, 950 F.2d 492, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1991).
212. The government party might be willing to consent to an EAJA adjudication in return for some other advantage, such as a factual stipulation or waiver of procedural right.
The EAJA, however, was passed to mitigate the effect of the government's inherent, yet
coercive litigation advantages, see S. REP. No. 253, supra note 88, at 5, and to encourage
adjudications on the merits. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 10, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4988. The EAJA represents an attempt to improve citizens' access to the
court system. See S. REP. No. 253, supra note 88, at 7. The possibility of a government party
using access to this supposedly access-creating Act as a bargaining chip violates the purpose
of the EAJA.
213. Sabino, supra note 114, at 488.
214. See supra notes 133, 147 and accompanying text.
215. Sabino, supra note 114, at 488.
216. As the Supreme Court has observed, "Congressional inaction lacks 'persuasive significance' because 'several equally tenable inferences' may be drawn from such inaction, 'including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.'"
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962)). For a general discussion of the meaning of congressional
inaction, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67
(1988).
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Courts must interpret the EAJA currently before them, and as this
Note has demonstrated, the text, history, and purposes of the statute all indicate that bankruptcy courts already have the authority to
shift fees against the federal government.
CONCLUSION

Congress enacted the EAJA to increase access to the court system by encouraging litigants to challenge unreasonable government
positions. The bankruptcy courts are not immune to unreasonable
government positions. The coercive nature of an adversary with the
vast resources of the United States weighs heavily on a party trying
to salvage its estate or contract rights in the bankruptcy court. The
chance to assert one's rights without the additional expense of litigation encourages parties to assert their rights. Bankruptcy court
authority over EAJA petitions serves the purposes of the EAJA.
In addition, the language of the statute that grants authority to
"any court" having subject-matter jurisdiction firmly supports
bankruptcy court authority over the BAJA. The confounding history of the EAJA, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the transition period, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipeline Co., the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, and the subsequent amendments to the EAJA's definition of "court" create considerable ambiguity, particularly with respect to the EAJA's legislative history. A careful examination of
each event within its historical context, however, leads to the single
conclusion that Congress intended the bankruptcy courts to have
EAJA power. By examining the history of the EAJA, this Note has
reconciled the seeming direct contradiction between the language
of the EAJA and its legislative history. The reconciliation points to
bankruptcy court jurisdiction over EAJA petitions.
It is true that Congress has remained silent on the issue, despite
a controversy in the courts. This silence, however, does not indicate
congressional opposition to bankruptcy court authority. In fact,
Congress has not subsequently refuted its original extension of
EAJA power to the bankruptcy courts. The arguments that rely on
Congress's silence to exclude the bankruptcy courts from EAJA authority simply misinterpret Congress's actions since the EAJA's
enactment.
Finally, alternative ways for bankruptcy litigants to recover their
fees if they prevail against the government are implausible due to
their expense and impracticability. The very existence of these proposals suggests that even those who believe the EAJA does not
grant the bankruptcy courts the ability to shift fees believe that litigants should be able to recover their fees in the bankruptcy courts.
Instead of looking elsewhere, however, courts need only rely upon
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the text, history, and purposes of the BAJA itself to recognize the
authority of bankruptcy courts to shift fees and costs against the
United States.

